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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-108 *4 June 1996*

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Balkans: Text of Geneva Meeting Statement

LD0306161696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1518 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, June 3 (TANJUG)—The following is the integral text of the agreed statement adopted in Geneva Sunday evening by participants in meeting of signatories of Dayton peace agreement.

The three presidents and signatories of the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian President Izetbegovic, Croatian President Tudjman and Serbian President Milosevic, met in Geneva on June 2 at the invitation of Secretary of State Christopher with the support of the Contact Group governments for a continuation of their discussions on steps needed to move forward with the peace process.

Also attending the gathering were high representative Carl Bildt, OSCE [Orghanization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Chairman-in-office, Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti and OSCE mission head Robert Frowick, Supreme Allied Commander General George Joulwan and IFOR [Implementation Force] Commander Admiral Leighton Smith, and representatives of Contact Group countries and international organizations participating in implementation of the agreement.

Noting that this was one of a series of meetings that will take place during June, including the Berlin Contact Group ministerial, the Florence mid-term review conference and the Lyon summit, which will provide added impetus to the peace process, the presidents and the representatives of the entities welcomes the continued, active engagement of the Contact Group and the international community. They also expressed full support for the work of the high representative and the Implementation Force.

Joined by representatives of the two Bosnian entities, the presidents emphasized that the most important next step in the peace process will be to hold free and fair elections within the time period established by the agreement. They recommitted themselves to the task of establishing the necessary conditions for these elections under the supervision of the OSCE. Delay in the elections risks widening the divisions which continue to exist.

The presidents and entity representatives stressed that free and fair elections will provide a democratic mandate for the governmental institutions to be established within the entities and at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They stressed their common conviction that rapid establishment of these institutions is essential if the process of building a democratic society which enjoys the support of all the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to succeed.

Having consulted with the OSCE chairman-in-office and OSCE mission head, the three presidents and the entity delegations endorsed the announcement of a date on which elections will be held on the basis of the conditions specified by the OSCE and the agreement. In their view, establishment of a specific date will provide a focus for the work remaining to achieve the full standards established by the OSCE. Achievement of these standards is essential for the holding of free and fair elections.

The presidents and entity representatives also agreed to a series of concrete steps to help meet the standards established by the OSCE. They agreed that full respect for the rules and regulations established by the provisional election commission on the basis of the pleace agreement will be necessary if the elections are to meet these standards and welcomed the assistance of the OSCE and other international organizations in providing assistance to the parties in creating conditions for elections.

In recognition of their responsibility for creating momentum for peace, the presidents and entire representatives, along with other participants, also agreed that establishment of a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires full implementation of all provisions of the agreement, in addition to those concerning elections. They committed themselves to building confidence among the communities and peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the peace process and agreed to refrain from the statement or action which might undermine implementation of the peace agreement.

They noted in particular:

The obligations of all parties to fully cooperate in the investigation of war crimes and prosecution of all persons indicted for war crimes and to abide by the prohibition on persons indicted by the criminal tribunal for war crimes seeking and holding an appointive, elective or other public office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The need for more concerted efforts to ensure freedom of movement to facilitate the return of refugees, recognizing that the right to move freely and without fear throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina is a cornerstone of elections and of a lasting peace. Toward this end, they agreed to work strictly within the UNHCR [UN High Commission for Refugees] guidelines to make more substantial progress in this area, cooperating closely with UNHCR, IFOR and the International Police Task Force. They noted the agreement signed on May 29, 1996 by Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Switzerland, and Germany relating to the terms of refugee return.

The obligation to provide free and equal access to the media in compliance with relevant OSCE regulations, not only for effective conduct of the elections but also for the establishment of a democratic society throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region as a whole.

The necessity of commencing the Brcko area arbitration as stipulated in Annex II, Article 5 of the agreement and the value of securing an early solution in the interests of a lasting peace. They welcomed the appointment of the arbitrator from the federation and undertook

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to encourage agreement on the other two arbitrators quickly.

The importance of concluding arms control talks under article iv of the agreement. The presidents underscored the urgency of achieving an agreement in advance of the June 11 deadline and have directed their negotiators to reach an agreement this week.

The importance of the international community's economic reconstruction program in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They welcomed the efforts made by the international community thus far, looked forward to full implementation of the reconstruction program and urged an acceleration of the realization of pledges.

Annex to Agreed Statement:

In order to fully realize the undertakings contained in the agreed statement, the three presidents and entity representatives, committed to implement the following steps:

Freedom of Movement

1. The parties recognize that the right and ability to move freely and without fear throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina is an essential cornerstone of elections and of a lasting peace. They acknowledge that it is the parties themselves, at both the local and entity level, who bear primary responsibility for the security of all individuals in areas under their authority.

2. The parties pledge to provide security for inter-entity bus service and to ensure that such service is not impeded in any way.

3. They also welcome the support of the Implementation Force and the International Police Task force in continuing the provision of a secure environment so that freedom of movement can be fully realized by the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They pledge to fully cooperate with both of these forces as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure full compliance.

4. The parties agreed that a delegation from the Bosnian federation would visit Belgrade to discuss the normalization of railway and air traffic, cooperation in heavy industry, postal, telegraph and telephone services, and in other fields relevant to the development of economic cooperation.

Media Access

1. Taking note of the agreement on media access reached at Blair House by federation authorities, the parties agreed to extend these measures throughout the country.

2. The parties agreed to support fully the open broadcast network project and other media support projects being coordinated through the office of the high representative and the OSCE.

Administrative and Confidence-Building Measures

1. In order to ensure that election preparations are conducted as smoothly as possible, the parties have committed to take the following specific actions: Constitute remaining local election commissions within the districts determined by the OSCE and provide them with appropriate office space and administrative staff. The parties would welcome the financial support of the international community in the establishment of these offices. Comply with the recent agreement of relevant ministers under the auspices of the joint civilian commission to recognize the validity of drivers' licenses, license plates, automobile registration, and automobile insurance issued by either entity, subsequently reach agreement on a uniform license plate within three months, and ensure that local authorities impelement these agreements fully. Ensure that local authorities cease confiscating identity documents issued by either entity. Recognize without conditions press credentials issued by either entity, IFOR or OSCE. Reestablish telephone connections between the entities making use of all available technical assistance. Allow all candidates and parties to engage in political activity and campaign freely and without obstruction in both entities.

2. The presidents of Serbia and Croatia agree that refugees who wish to vote in person will be allowed unimpeded transit of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and Croatia. They also undertake to work closely with the OSCE and other international organizations to facilitate voting by refugees present in their territory.

3. The parties agree to ensure the passage and implementation of amnesty laws which meet international standards for non war crimes-related offenses.

4. The parties agree to report on implementation of the above measures at the Florence mid-term review conference.

Mostar

1. The parties also welcome the decision of the European Union administrtator for Mostar to hold municipal elections in Mostar on June 30 and provide for the participation of refugees and displaced persons in those elections.

2. The presidents of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the federation agree to take steps to ensure unimpeded and unharrassed crossings between east and west Mostar.

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Albania: Electoral Commission Statement on Election Results

AU0406150796 Tirana ATA in English 1038 GMT 4 Jun 96

["Central Electoral Commission Reports on Second Round of Polls"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 3 (ATA)—The second round of the elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania was held on June 2, 1996 in nine constituencies, in which none of the candidates presented had captured more than 50 per cent of the valid votes in the respective constituencies.

In the second round of vote, according to the Law on Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania, electors vote for the two candidates who in the respective constituencies have captured the greatest number of votes.

Given that the candidates of the Socialist Party and other left opposition parties withdrew from the poll, being subjected to the decisions of the respective electoral subjects, in a some of these constituencies, the electoral race included candidates of other subjects who in the first round had captured a greater number of votes.

The Democratic Party, which, based on the first round results enjoyed the right to take part in all the second round contesting constituencies, pulled out of three constituencies, leaving its candidates in the other six ones.

Also, the Human Rights Union Party, Kosta Kristo Makariadhi and Thanas Niko Dhroso, respectively in Constituencies 110 and 111, withdrew from the second round election race.

Finally, the second round of vote includes the following candidates:

—In Constituency 20: Gjon Markagjoni for the Republican Party and Mark Gjon Ruci for the Social-Democratic Union Party.

—In Constituency 68: Tomorr Pellumb Plangarica for the Democratic Party and Bashkim Shuaip Hyseni for the Republican Party.

—In Constituency 71: Tomorr Kasem Malasi for the Democratic Party and Qerim Kamber Dashi for the Republican Party.

—In Constituency 75: Gjovalin Koli Daka for the Democratic Party and Pellumb Rrapush Xhaferi for the Balli Kombetar [National Front] Party.

—In Constituency 97: Rexhep Hajdar Bregu for the Democratic Party and Luan Rasim Molla for the Balli Kombetar Party.

—In Constituency 99: Isa Vait Sinani for the Republican Party and Riza Islam Berberi for the Legaliteti [Legality] Movement Party.

—In Constituency 108: Duk Azem Muca for the Balli Kombetar Party and Jorgji Dhimo Zaho for the Human Rights Union Party.

—In Constituency 110: Genc Stefanaq Pollo for the Democratic Party and Perparim Njazi Skenderi for the Republican Party.

—In Constituency 111: Fatos Asllan Bejo for the Democratic Party and Arshi Firuzan Beca for the Balli Kombetar Party.

According to information obtained through contacts with these constituencies and according to the respective commissions' protocols, the voting for the second round has been calm, free, and the participation massive. The law has been rigorously applied by the polling stations' and constituencies' electoral commissions.

The commission members, political parties representatives in these commissions as well as local and foreign observers, who have monitored the voting procedure in these constituencies, have not noted irregularities and have made no remarks regarding the poll.

According to the final protocols on the voting results, some 115,324 voters have taken part in the poll, that is 59.38 per cent of the voters enrolled in the respective lists. In relation to the first round, the participation of the electors in the second round reaches the figure of 67.89 per cent.

At the end of the poll and the counting of the electors' votes, those who have won in the second round according to the respective constituencies are:

—In Constituency 20: Gjon Mark Markagjoni.

—In Constituency 68: Tomorr Pellumb Plangarica.
—In Constituency 71: Tomorr Kasem Malasi.
—In Constituency 76: Gjovalin Koli Daka.
—In Constituency 97: Rexhep Hajdar Bregu.
—In Constituency 99: Isa Vait Sinani.
—In Constituency 108: Duk Azem Muca.
—In Constituency 110: Genc Stefanaq Pollo.
—In Constituency 111: Fatos Asllan Beja.

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Albania: PS Praises U.S. Position on Elections, Democracy

AU0406160796 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 4 Jun 96 p 2

[Statement issued by the Socialist Party in Tirana on 2 June: "The U.S. Uncompromising Stand on Defending Principles and Standards of Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist Party [PS] has analyzed with particular attention and care the announcement by the U.S. State Department's spokesman made on 1 June, considering this declaration to be a realistic stand taken by the U.S. Government toward the elections of 26 May, which the Albanian opposition and a number of Albanian and foreign observers found not to be free or democratic. We see the U.S. Government's position as a sign of the commitment and interest the United States has displayed in the progress of democratic developments in Albania and in ensuring peace and calm in the region.

The State Department's report of "a large number of characteristic irregularities in these elections" and of the fact that the Albanian elections of 26 May were "a significant step backward in comparison with the parliamentary elections of 1992" testifies to the principled and uncompromising position of the United States whenever the principles and standards of democracy are to be defended. The report accepts that "cases were observed in which the authorities violated the Electoral Law, including cases in which the counting of the votes was manipulated and bundles of ballot papers were thrown in the boxes." The "threatening presence of armed guards" was also reported at the polling stations.

The PS also appreciates the unswerving position of the United States regarding "the prospects for democratic progress" as the "foundation stone of our relations with Albania," which in other words means that the U.S. Government has supported and will continue to support the development of democratic processes in Albania without taking the side of any particular political force or individual.

Like the other opposition forces, the PS has stated that the 26 May elections were an electoral farce and a coup d'etat arranged in advance by Berisha's regime, and for this reason abandoned them. This wise decision by the opposition may have led to difficulties in "assessing the real scale of the problems" and to "dishonesty in the counting" of the votes, but it was above all decisive in averting the planned confrontation between the armed forces of the police and the secret service and members of the polling station commissions and the electorate.

The PS appreciates the proposal "to seek assistance from the international community in order to investigate the irregularities." The PS thinks that the irregularities are of an essential character, and are connected with the intention and scheme of the ruling party and President Berisha to carry out large-scale manipulation throughout the country. The PS on this occasion expresses its willingness to ask for assistance from the international community, and in the meantime to contribute to and cooperate with the investigation of the chain of events and mechanisms that led to the electoral farce of 26 May. The PS is ready to offer democratic ways and means to redress this course of events.

The PS stresses on this occasion that not only are the Democratic Party and the state totally unprepared for dialogue, but they are persistently and arbitrarily exerting pressure, cutting off all the telephone lines of the PS and its newspaper, sequestering almost all its cars, and most recently cutting off its drinking water at a time when its candidates for deputy are on hunger strike.

The PS, expressing the opinion of its members and supporters, welcomes the declaration by the U.S. State Department spokesman, and believes that the United States will continue to contribute to the progress of democratic processes in Albania.

Albania: Strike Leader on U.S. Proposal for New Elections

AU0306163296 Tirana ATA in English 1201 GMT 3 Jun 96

[Report by Lindita Karadaku and Viktor Cenosinaj, including an interview with Pandeli Majko, Socialist Party hunger strike leader, in Tirana on 2 June]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 2 (ATA)—Candidates for deputies presented by the Socialist Party [PS] in the May 26 elections are in a hunger strike in the PS headquarters in Tirana since last Friday.

Passers-by round the PS headquarters walk indifferently. Three policemen keep looking calmly at money changers, who also addressed us with: "Any dollars, DM [German marks] or drachmas to change?"

Policemen keep calm although a crowd of 20 people in the yard of the Socialist Party headquarters utter offences for the president, the government and call for gathering through a communist song of World War Second. A man with a hat, about 60, chants slogans which are repeated by the whole crowd in chorus.

Passers-by stop with curiosity for a moment and look at the crowd consisting of old people with sports caps,

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some boys with an intimidating view and several women with bags in their hands.

We enter the main hall with the impression that we will not be allowed to go into as it happened with Albanian TV reporters. A guard does not allow anyone to go inside. He asks our names and somebody else from inside the headquarters where hunger strikers are, give our names to the strike leader, Pandeli Majko.

Majko welcomes us kindly and gives us an authorization to enter up to the inner stairs of the building, but refuses to allow us to visit the hall where socialist candidates are staging their hunger strike. He himself looks calm and without problems related to the lack of food. Former chairman of Euro-Socialists Pandeli Majko, now substituted by Ilir Meta, agrees to respond our questions:

ATA: As we see, are the permissions to come here authorized by you?

Majko: Yes.

ATA: This is a hunger strike and I believe people are not allowed to come out of the hunger strike.

Majko: Anyhow, rules are strict, with some small exception, especially for those candidates for deputy who have come from the districts. In a meeting we unanimously decided to stage a hunger strike but participants could not inform their families about it. Family members have come to meet the hunger strikers who are also allowed for such contacts. They have brought things like cigarettes and clothes, which are allowed according to the regulation of the strike.

ATA: The press says that most of participants in the hunger strike are candidates for deputy who did not win in the last elections or deputies in the former legislature who were not standing for these elections. How would you comment it?

Majko: The present participants in the hunger strike are only candidates for deputy standing for the May 26 elections. Regarding the fact who won and who did not win, I may say that the result is based only on the figures of the Democratic Party, while our reports about elections show we have a higher percentage of votes than presented.

ATA: Are your data based on polls?

Majko: I would like to repeat a statement made not only by foreign reporters but especially by Euro-Socialists of a district who consider the hunger strike as the legitimate parliament of Albania.

ATA: Do you refer to results issued by the polls with people?

Majko: Let us not go into confidential talk. We have our own information.

ATA: You have said that elections were manipulated by the state, Berisha, the National Information Service [ShIK], and by other people. But we have noted that the results of these elections are not much different from those of 1992. In the 1992 elections 92 candidates for deputy of the Democratic Party won through direct voting while in 1996, their number was 96. Six candidates of PS won in the first legislature, five have won in this legislature, at least according to official outcome. The past elections were considered free and fair, the latest ones are considered unfair and not free, what's your comment upon it?

Majko: I think that the statement of the U.S. Department, which says that the May 26 elections represent a step backward as compared to those of 1992, is the best comment.

ATA: But the same statement also says that the opposition must accept responsibility for its withdrawal before elections were over.

Majko: Precisely the withdrawal gave a boost to manipulations.

ATA: Don't you feel guilty of it?

Majko: Honestly speaking, I feel partially guilty, but better to feel guilty this way than to allow the people's vote be violated and perhaps even greater confrontation.

ATA: You said that you feel partially guilty. Is this your judgment or the Socialist Party too feels it is half-guilty?

Majko: I think you didn't get my idea. When I said half-guilty I didn't refer to the first meaning of this word, but I used it ironically, because no one in Albania apologizes for faults which are perhaps one hundred times greater such as beatings and detention of deputies, while you insistently urge me to discuss a half-guiltiness.

ATA: What about the American suggestion on the partial re-run of the elections?

Majko: I think this is the first step to a historical compromise which may be offered to Albania. Since we started the hunger strike, we also expressed our option for a dialogue with government institutions. I think that the coming of the foreign observers is a very important move. We have strongly approved their presence.

ATA: Will you take into consideration the American suggestion or not?

Majko: Certainly. Without affecting the essence of our demands, we think that the presence of the foreign

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observers in Albania represents the first step for the beginning of an open dialogue in Albania.

ATA: Will you refuse a partial re-run of elections?

Majko: We have strongly approved only the presence of foreign observers. It is still too early to express an opinion. Let's wait and see whether the government members will agree or not on the arrival of foreign observers.

ATA: Are you for a complete re-run of elections, or for a partial ballot as the U.S. Department of State recommends in its latest statement?

Majko: Read the Statement of the U.S. Department of State.

ATA: I've read the statement and it asks for a partial re-run.

Majko: Read the statement of the hunger strike.

ATA: However, as a hunger strike leader, can you give us a precise reply to this?

Majko: Our hunger strike has its objectives and I, as leader of this strike, can't play with the points of this strike.

Albania: Interior Ministry Statement on Request for Rallies

AU0306195196 Tirana ATA in English 1401 GMT 3 Jun 96

["Interior Ministry Press Release"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 3 (ATA)—An Interior Ministry press release, issued on Monday, says:

"The Socialist Party [PS], through the official document 192, dated June 2, 1996, and the Democratic Party [PD], through the official document 401, dated June 2, 1996, ask to hold rallies in the "Skenderbeg" square.

The Interior Ministry reports that the "Skenderbeg" square is a public place, which is not approved for mass activities like rallies, gatherings and manifestations for any of the political subjects due to heavy traffic of vehicles and people as well as to the disorders its blocking brings about.

The Interior Ministry reports that it is ready to take measures for the development of these activities in the following places:

1. The Sports Ground "Ali Demi"

2. Two of Tirana's stadiums
3. The pupils campus sports ground
4. The "Asllan Rusi" Sports Hall

The Ministry asks the political subjects, the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and others to respect the laws in force on the development of gatherings and manifestations. It wants them to take all the necessary measures to maintain and not violate law and order during the activity to be carried out in one of the aforesaid places and not to create conditions leading to disorders," the announcement concludes.

Albania: PS Says Army on Full Alert, Tirana 'Surrounded'

AU0306154996 Tirana KOHA JONE in A[illegible]an 2 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by E. Barci: "Tirana Surrounded by the Army and the National Intelligence Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A statement by the Socialist Party [PS] General Management Committee distributed to the entire diplomatic corps yesterday states that "Tirana is surrounded by forces of the Army and the National Intelligence Service [ShIK]." According to the data of the largest opposition party, military forces are on full alert. "The same is true in other districts of the country," states the letter signed by Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi. The PS expresses its anxiety that this has created a situation of great tension among the civil population. However, PS headquarters was experiencing the most serious siege. Since Tuesday [28 May], the party's 18 telephone lines have been totally cut, making communication with the party and political and government circles possible only by courier. The telephones of ZERI I POPULLIT were cut off yesterday, making it virtually impossible for the newspaper to function. The siege was intensified yesterday to the point that all the presidium's motor vehicles were sequestered by the police. The couriers going to embassies and other parties have to rely on their feet or supporters' cars. However, the citizens of Tirana are also experiencing a siege. According to the PS statement, the state has cut off Euronews' satellite broadcasts to Albania. Two weeks before the elections, the booster for satellite broadcasts to Tirana removed CNN. Many Albanians did not have the chance to see how U.S. cameras recorded how Berisha's police beat up the opposition leaders, who enjoy immunity. Following harsh Western criticism of the regime established last Sunday [26 May], Berisha may react by resuming the jamming of foreign stations. An order to call in satellite dishes is also expected. Faced with the criticism of the world, Berisha has two options: either to examine his motives, or to close the world's mouth and his citizens' ears.

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Bulgaria: Pirinski Wants Ties to Skopje 'Unblocked'

AU0406075896 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 4 Jun 96 p 18

[Statement by Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski; place and date not given: "We Must Unblock Relations With Skopje"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our relations with Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which were affected by the so-called language dispute, must be unblocked. We must seek solutions that are mutually acceptable to both countries. We agreed with my Macedonian colleague that Bulgaria should send experts to Skopje to find as soon as possible a solution to the dispute regarding the Macedonian language.

Postponing the Balkan meeting in Sofia is a result of the fact that several states, which were to take participate, cannot be there for various reasons. In addition, the Sofia forum coincides with the Florence meeting, where the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace process must be continued.

We are prepared to hold the Balkan meeting in late June. We also discussed with Macedonian Foreign Minister Frckovski the possibility of holding the meeting in late July.

Bulgaria: 'Sweeping Changes' Said Imminent in BSP

AU0406081296 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 4 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Neda Popova: "Videnov To Be Subjected to Pressure at Secret Meeting To Replace Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sources at 20 Positano Street [Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP, headquarters] are saying that a secret meeting of the socialist leaders will take place today, at which an attempt will be made to convince Videnov to replace at least several ministers. About 10 high-ranking BSP leaders, who really govern the country, will take part in the meeting, the sources at the socialist headquarters are saying. At this stage, the prime minister is prepared to agree only to the replacement of deputy ministers.

Yesterday, people in the corridors at 20 Positano Street were whispering that Videnov is prepared to agree to a compromise in order to remain in power. Contrary to his real wish, he will agree to changes in the BSP Executive Bureau and the cabinet. The names of the ministers and the unruly members of the Executive Bureau who will remain without posts in the executive and power structure are already known.

Doncho Konakchiev will leave the Executive Bureau and his post as BSP deputy chairman because of his numerous commitments as deputy prime minister. Nikolay Dobrev will be released from the Executive Bureau, because of his engagement as minister of internal affairs. Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov and Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev will remain cabinet members until the end of June because of the agreement with the IMF, which would be signed by that time.

Yesterday sources were saying that Ivan Angelov will part with his post as adviser to the prime minister and Balkanbank supervisor.

Sweeping changes are expected in the BSP leadership. Of all the BSP deputy chairmen, only Krasimir Premyanov will preserve his post. Georgi Purvanov will say good-bye to his post as deputy chairmen because of his too independent thinking and the fiasco in the Kurdzhali elections. The fourth deputy chairman—Yanaki Stoilov—will replace Mladen Chervenyakov as minister of justice. According to another version, Stoilov will become BSP chairman at an extraordinary congress.

Nikola Koychev, whom Videnov is grooming for Industry Minister Vuchev's post, and Yuriy Borisov, who recently angered Videnov with his defense of Granitski [television director], will also be ousted from the Executive Bureau. The other high-ranking leader to be ousted from the Executive Bureau is Vladimir Topencharov, who angered Videnov with his too close relations with the media.

Bulgaria: Possible 'Coup' Against Videnov on 9 Jun

AU0406074996 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 4 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Ekaterina Nikolova: "Coup on 9 June Could Make Pirinski Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Friday night plenum of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] ended with a categorical victory for Aleksandur Lilov and Andrey Lukanov. For the first time, Videnov was left without any choice, and he had to accept the ultimatum to reshuffle the cabinet and the party leadership. This is the first time since the BSP returned to power that the Supreme Council has adopted such a categorical decision on structural and personnel changes and has allotted such a short term to implement the task, something for which even the Constitution allows twice as much time. For the first time, Lilov's people have clearly threatened the party

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leader that if he does not implement their instructions they will topple him.

Despite all this, forecasts indicate that the prime minister-party leader will not fully obey—regarding neither the cabinet reshuffle, nor the purge in the BSP leadership, nor the measures to be adopted within seven days. If Videnov makes any changes in the cabinet, they will be cosmetic in nature, while there will possibly be no changes in the Executive Bureau, claim sources at No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters]. Deputies and party members are also pessimists regarding the possibility of the prime minister proposing a new program to supply the population with bread and most necessary goods. On Friday night, Videnov told his people that they themselves have approved his platform, and there is no sense in or time for composing a new one.

The demand to adopt specific measures to save the citizens from hunger was included in writing in the plenum's decision at the specific insistence of Aleksandur Lilov. The eventual refusal to implement this instruction, as well as the other two, provides the Strategist [Lilov] with an exceptionally strong trump card. In the last few weeks, people in the BSP have been saying that Lilov and Lukanov have begun to implement step by step their plan to effect a coup within the party, initiated at the BSP's 10 March plenum. The plan must end on 9 June—a legendary date for the former Communists—[On 9 June 1923 the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union government led by Aleksandur Stamboliyski was overthrown in a military coup, an event which led to the September 1923 procommunist insurrection in Bulgaria]. On the previous day—8 June—a plenum of the BSP will begin at which the party candidates for the posts of president and vice president will be nominated, and at which changes in the cabinet and party will be discussed and a new program adopted. It is not by accident that these—at first glance different—issues will be simultaneously discussed. The identity of the prime minister will depends on whom the BSP nominates as candidate for president. According to the plan, if Videnov does not implement the instructions of the BSP Supreme Council, on 9 June, the executive power could possibly be transferred to Georgi Pirinski. This automatically makes Aleksandur Lilov BSP presidential candidate.

The success depends to a large degree on the decision of the party commission, which will check whether the socialist candidates meet the conditions posed by the Constitution. If this organ—led not accidentally by Yanaki Stoilov, Lilov's disciple—can determine by this week that Foreign Minister Pirinski is not Bulgarian by birth [Pirinski was born in the United States and his mother was reportedly a U.S. citizen], the commission will propose the Strategist as candidate for the post of president. If not—the participants in the plenum themselves could do the same, because at this plenum the floor will no longer be taken by the surrogates of Lukanov and Lilov, but by the two leaders themselves. It will no longer be Kosta Andreev and Mincho Minchev who will demand the ouster of Videnov from power, but the two former leaders.

For months, rumors have been disseminated about the creation of innerparty cabinets of the clans of Lilov and Lukanov. According to those rumors Karlovich [Lukanov] will control the new cabinet through Pirinski, and the cabinet will be composed mostly of Lukanov's people. What remains for Lilov and his people will be the presidential post for Lilov himself, and two honorable posts—Yanaki Stoilov as deputy prime minister and Nikolay Kamov as foreign minister.

Videnov must make a move in the next seven days. It is already too late to include real professionals in the cabinet—they could not repair the damage done by the present team, because our country needs a new model for governing and a fundamentally different policy. Therefore, the prime minister has two choices: He must either include in the cabinet the members of the BSP Executive Bureau—Nikola Koychev, Kiril Zhelev, and Yuriy Borisov—and thus cajole the BSP Supreme Council by stressing that the best party people are working for the state, or rebel against Lilov and Lukanov. In either case, Videnov will lose. He is in a situation in which every move is wrong, and this makes his tenure as prime minister a matter of time.

Bulgaria: BSP Sources Predict Fall of Videnov in Jul

AU0406085996 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 4 Jun 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Videnov Falls in July"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A source at 20 Positano Street [Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP, headquarters] has told KONTINENT that members of the BSP leadership are conceiving a plan to topple Videnov's government in July.

Until then, the Democratic Left will not attack the cabinet in order not to jeopardize the agreement with the IMF. The agreement is expected to be signed by the end of June, while the first installment of the loan is expected by the end of July. Only then will the Democratic Left force the government to resign. A new government will be formed, which will have the financial possibilities of overcoming the stagnation in the country, the source

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said. According to him, this is the only way the BSP can restore the confidence our society had in the party and achieve a good result in the presidential elections in the fall.

People from the hard-line wing at 20 Positano Street confirmed that Aleksandur Lilov's and Andrey Lukanov's people really are developing a plan to topple Videnov as prime minister and form a new government of the Democratic Left. According to those sources, Lukanov is trying to convince Foreign Minister Pirinski not to participate in the presidential election and head the new government. Kiril Tsochev [former deputy prime minister] will become one of the deputy prime ministers, while the posts of ministers and deputy ministers will be offered to extraparliamentary forces.

Because of the agreement with the IMF, the BSP leaders have for the time being postponed their move to demand the resignations of Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev and Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov. The pressure to replace the economic ministers will abate in order to facilitate the start of the essential part of mass privatization. At the BSP plenum on Friday, however, Videnov was categorically told that he must dismiss Agriculture Minister Svetoslav Shivarov. This would be the only way of at least partially assuaging the popular discontent at the grain and bread crisis. Socialist deputies are saying that Videnov is pondering the issue of how most painlessly to get rid of Shivarov. They recall that after the resignation of Vasil Chichibaba [former minister of agriculture] the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union sent an ultimatum to 20 Positano Street that if Shivarov did not replace Chichibaba they would leave the coalition with the BSP.

Bulgaria: Videnov Assesses Political Cost of Reforms

AU0306201496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] I am certain that Bulgaria will restore itself much sooner than some people expect at the moment, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov declared on the "Open Door" program of Bulgarian National Television. Mr. Videnov stressed that the cost of the structural reform will be expressed most strongly in political terms. I am prepared to pay my portion of the cost and more, but one also has to think about the party and the Democratic Left coalition, Zhan Videnov said. In my view, the prime minister declared on the program, they are quite capable of coping with the political cost of such measures in a worthy manner, if guarantees are provided that the social cost is fairly distributed and accordingly is bearable for the people most unable to help themselves to face the destructive aspect of the changes.

Bulgaria: BSP Councils Propose Presidential Candidates

AU0306163496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Socialists in Pleven decided to propose five presidential candidates for discussion by the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council, our correspondent Tsetska Nikolova reports. Listed alphabetically, the five proposed candidates are Aleksandur Lilov, Georgi Pirinski, Yordan Shkolagerski, Nikolay Kamov, and Nora Ananieva. The Pleven Region BSP Council adopted this decision at a meeting today in which local National Assembly deputies Andrey Lukanov, Todor Pandov, Tosho Mukhtanov, and Mariana Khristova took part.

Georgi Pirinski should be the BSP candidate for the presidential elections—this is the proposal of the Socialists of Khaskovo to the BSP Supreme Council, adopted at today's session of the Khaskovo Region BSP Council. The council named Aleksandur Lilov as a second possible candidate, and also proposed Ginyo Ganev and Academician Blagovest Sendov as possible candidates for vice president. The Khaskovo Socialists approved the formula that the BSP presidential candidate should be a party representative, while the candidate for vice president should be selected from a wider range, including circles outside the BSP coalition. Klara Marinova, member of the BSP Supreme Council, took part in the meeting.

At the meeting of the Ruse Region BSP Council today, consensus was reached on nominating Georgi Pirinski to the BSP Supreme Council as their preferred presidential candidate, followed by Nikolay Kamov, Aleksandur Lilov, and Blagovest Sendov.

Bulgaria: Opposition Council Approves Stoyanov's Candidacy

AU0406135796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Report by Mariya Tsankova]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its meeting today, the opposition's Political Council accepted the reports of the Central Commission for the Primary Elections on the ballots held on 1 June. The Political Council decided that the united democratic opposition will nominate the victorious candidate Petur Stoyanov as its candidate in the presidential elections.

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Over 30 National Assembly deputies from the Union of Democratic Forces, People's Union, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms have signed the motion calling for a no-confidence vote in Zhan Videnov's government. The main reasons cited in the motion include the cabinet's lack of an economic program to tackle the crisis, the lack of sufficient public support for the government, and the lack of confidence shown by the international financial institutions. The no-confidence motion is to be deposited at the National Assembly's business office before the end of the day. It is also supported by the three independent deputies of New Democracy.

Bulgaria: Editor Ridicules Zhelev for Defeat

AU0306162096 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 3 Jun 96 p 7

[Commentary by Stefan Prodev: "Good-Bye, Mister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Judgment Day came. DUMA's prediction materialized. President Zhelev emerged as a bankrupted candidate-president. Furthermore, his bankruptcy is not the doing of the socialist tribe he hates so much, but the doing of his own friends. Now nothing is left for him but to withdraw to the depths of the cave, where the phantoms are more numerous than the glowworms.

The drama is horrible. Only a few hours before he found himself on the downward slope, the gentleman still deemed himself a winner. Now the Roman proverb about the fleeting character of glory proves again to be right. At least Stambolov [Bulgarian prime minister during the period 1887-94], whom Zhelev tried so hard to emulate, departed dead from the political scene. Zhelev is leaving the same scene as a clown. The bugs he himself produced turned into dragons and ate him up completely. This happens always when a small man tries to play the role of a big politician.

I do not know to whose advice this simple optimist listened, but he believed that he is more powerful than anyone else. Now he fell with such a noise that even his most ardent supporters are embarrassed. Life again demonstrated that stupidity is punished even in politics. You can be a philosopher, but this does not mean that you are smart. The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] concocted its trap and Zhelev fell into it. The hatred, on which he relied as the guarantor of his success, killed him. This was a hatred against both his friends and enemies. This happens always when a head of state does not keep a cool head.

Now everyone is anticipating his new television appearance. What would Zhelev tell the people? That he is desperate and deceived, and that he refuses to recognize the elections' result? He will certainly think of something, but whatever he splutters will be undignified. This is so not because he collapsed—this was anticipated—but because he must now explain his collapse. We can already envisage his face and predict his words. Both his face and words will be sad, but there is nothing we could do. Sometimes even the saddest tears evoke laughter.

It is horrible when one receives a slap in the face from those whom he believed. Zhelyu already got his. However, if the gentleman decides to run even after the slap he received, the game will become rough. Everyone will understand that His Honor has no honor. It is one thing to try and catch fish with bare hands, and another—to catch souls. The people are not fish. In addition, Zhelev's ambition would compromise those who defeated him. It will return them to the trap they themselves set. The presidential race will become a banal competition. Then not only him, but also his blue [SDS] rivals will have to live through their sad fiasco. But let us not be prophets. Sometimes even the worst player has the right to a prudent move.

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Czech Republic: Final Parliamentary Seat Allocation

LD0306123596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1301 GMT 3 Jun 96

[Live relay of news conference by Central Electoral Commission]

[FBIS Summary] The final seat allocation in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament is as follows:

1. Current government coalition:

Civic Democratic Party (ODS): 68

Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL): 18

Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA): 13

Total seats for current government coalition: 99

2. Current opposition:

Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD): 61

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM): 22

Association for the Republic- epublican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC): 18

Total seats for current opposition: 101

This means that the current coalition led by Vaclav Klaus is in the minority.

Czech Republic: Havel, Leading Parties Hold 'Fruitful' Talks

LD0306142796 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] At Prague Castle, Czech President Vaclav Havel is today meeting the chairmen of the strongest political parties [the Civic Democratic Party, the Czech Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, and the Civic Democratic Alliance. However, Havel has failed to invite the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, which is the third-strongest party after the elections, and the extreme right Republicans]. Eva Hulkova reports:

[Hulkova] [Passage omitted] After his talks with President Havel, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said a while ago:

[Begin Klaus recording] I will be really brief. We held very detailed, very fruitful talks. [passage omitted]

I think that options as to how to find a way out of the present slightly unexpected situation brought about by our elections are emerging. I see these options—in fact, one option—as a possible and hopeful option.

I would not like to say anything before the talks the president will hold with other chairmen representing three present parliamentary parties, and this is why I cannot tell you anything more. However, I think that at the end of this round of talks you can expect a more specific statement from the president. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Havel Discusses Elections, Prospects

LD0306190196 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1633 GMT 3 Jun 96

[News conference given by Czech President Vaclav Havel in Prague Castle, hosted by an unidentified moderator—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Havel] Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank all of the citizens for their high turnout at the elections. It is important for us and the world that the elections were democratic and that there were no major mishaps. My thanks also to all of the members of electoral commissions and other institutions that ensured the smooth running of the elections and that made sure we had the results so soon.

The results of parliamentary elections in our country may have surprised a few people. In my view, these elections have been won by state-forming powers. That means that democracy has won. I can say with satisfaction that the elections have confirmed our current trend in domestic policy and, above all, our foreign policy orientation. I cannot see any reason for anxiety. Admittedly, the forces are balanced, and this gives the political parties the opportunity to test their policies. I consider it important that the parties are capable of setting aside their mutual dislike, which I understood during the election campaign but which I now consider useless and harmful. In the current political talks, personal interests must be set aside and all of the political parties must concentrate on seeking a way out that would be best for the citizens.

If there is goodwill, we can cope with the situation, and we will view the solutions as a kind of test for our young democracy.

As to my role in the current political talks, I consider it my duty to create scope for understanding and seeking consensus. I can see no reason for hurrying. There is still a functioning government, and a new Chamber of Deputies will be formed soon. I prefer matter-of-fact, calm, and unhurried talks, leading toward setting up stable constitutional bodies. I consider it my duty to lead the major political parties toward all this.

I had very detailed talks with the chairmen of the parties of the current government coalition and with

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Mr. Zeman, chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party. After these talks, I reached the conclusion that it was within our power to reach an agreement about setting up functioning constitutional bodies. This kind of agreement, however, calls for further talks. That is why I will continue these talks, and that is why I asked the chairmen of the parties who visited me today that these talks be held.

[Moderator] Now you can ask questions. First, Czech Radio, Mrs. Kucerova.

[Kucerova] Mr. President I would like to ask you your idea of a solution to this situation.

[Havel] In my opinion, it would be best in this situation if the parties that formed the coalition so far try to form the future government coalition. This is, however, impossible without a clear agreement with a party that was given the second-largest number of seats, without continuous talks with this party about the manner and the conditions of its support for such a coalition.

[Unidentiied correspondent, in English followed by Czech translation] Mr. President, are you surprised or distressed by the fact that the Republican Party had such a strong showing in the elections?

[Havel] I am not particularly surprised, but I am not overjoyed, either.

[Moderator] Other questions? MLADA FRONTA DNES, please.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, is it possible that Mr. Klaus will be the new prime minister?

[Havel] I have not said clearly that I will appoint somebody to the office of prime minister who enjoys general political consensus. These talks will take place mainly between individual political parties. I want to serve as a moderator, as a creator of a favorable climate for these talks.

[Moderator] Television Nova, Mr. Vitek.

[Vitek] Vitek, Nova. Mr. President, do you envisage the possibility of a caretaker government?

[Havel] Our Constitution does not recognize the institution of a caretaker government. In theory, it is possible that the political parties could agree on such a government of experts. I would not see it as a good solution because it would be only temporary.

[Moderator] Further questions, please.

[Unidentified correspondent] What conditions does the social democracy stipulate?

[Havel] Ask them. I can only speak for myself.

[Polak, Monitor Radio United States, in Czech] My Czech is bad. I assume that the Czech financial markets are quite uneasy today. Do you think this is the end of the Czech economic miracle?.

[Havel] Absolutely not. I think that these swings can be observed after any elections anywhere. I think the basic trend of our reforms in not in jeopardy. I think that not only all of our citizens but also all shareholders at home and abroad can sleep in peace.

[Moderator] Last question. Marika Taborska, Czech Radio, please.

[Taborska] Mr. President, when Vaclav Klaus, the chairman of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] was leaving after talking with you, he said that he thought that, of all of the possible options, one seemed possible and looked hopeful. After your further talks with the other chairmen, do you think now that there is only one option?

[Havel] There is an option to which, I think, everybody is favorably inclined. However, this option has various suboptions and connections, which must be discussed at the coming talks in the next few days and weeks.

Czech Republic: Havel Comments on Appointment of PM

LD0306202196 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech President Vaclav Havel received at Prague Castle the four chairmen of the parties that were successful in the elections. He then gave a short news conference. The following is a report:

[Begin Havel recording] The act of appointing the prime minister, connected with his submitting a proposal for the composition of the government, is quite remote at present. First, the Chamber of Deputies must meet, the meeting must end, the Chamber of Deputies must elect its bodies. It is only then that the current government is going to resign. It is only then that I will ask it to continue performing its role up to the time the new government receives the confidence of parliament. It is only then that I will ask a person to propose the composition of the government and appoint this person the new prime minister. [end recording]

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Czech Republic: Klaus: Stalemate After Elections Unexpected

AU0306153796 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 3 Jun 96 pp 1, 3

["Exclusive" interview with Czech Prime Minister and ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova in Prague on 2 June: "The Stalemate Is Unexpected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Martinkova] Are the citizens to understand your nonappearance on the Debata [Debate] television program as a sign that you were unable to cope psychologically with the situation, as Milos Zeman is suggesting?

[Klaus] We had been saying to Czech Television since the beginning of the week that there was no sense in making Sunday's [2 June] Debata program with the party chairmen. Let the political scientists and commentators do the talking. The politicians should negotiate and look for starting points. Therefore, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] did not want to take part in Debata at all, but we decided just before it was broadcast that we would send Deputy Chairman Vlach.

[Martinkova] In the meantime, you managed to have a meeting with the president. What did you discuss?

[Klaus] I have had meetings all day today. Here, at home (in the government villa in Hanspaulka—editor's note), we held a meeting involving the most senior members of the ODS Board, at which we considered all sorts of options and scenarios. We planned how to get out of the stalemate. Apart from these meetings and telephone conversations, I met for about 50 minutes with the president. We held similar talks on the options and the alternatives.

[Martinkova] Have the developments surprised you?

[Klaus] The stalemate is unexpected. I did not anticipate the overwhelming victory by the current coalition that so many observers of our political scene had been predicting, but, all the same, I have to admit that I had anticipated a victory.

[Martinkova] Do some of the options for a solution already have clearer contours?

[Klaus] That would be very premature. The majority of the sensibly thinking participants are seeking a path that would not involve willfulness and artifice but would enable this country to continue in those things that have been its characteristic features for six and a half years—political, economic, and social stability. Specifying the options would be pointless. But they are already taking shape, and the magic will consist of their details.

[Martinkova] But Milos Zeman has options, too—persuading the president to appoint Josef Lux prime minister.

[Klaus] I do not know of this option, and I do not believe that Josef Lux would accede to it.

[Martinkova] What about the Republic's reputation abroad?

[Klaus] It had seemed that the Czech Republic would defy the standard cycle of the postcommunist countries, and, in essence, it has done so. Things turned out catastrophically for the governing reform parties in these countries. They abandoned their positions, and the opposition came to power. This has not happened in our country. Hence, no matter how bad they are, the election results are not so catastrophic. But they could have been better.

[Martinkova] Could the election results influence the koruna's exchange rate or the stock market?

[Klaus] There may be short-term fluctuations, but, because I still believe we will emerge from this situation with honor, I do not think that any medium and long-term economic quantity trends will be influenced.

[Martinkova] It will be hard for parliament to adopt laws, to say nothing of the constitutional...

[Klaus] Constitutional laws do not bother me so much because there should be terribly few of them. Some laws that require a simple majority could, even despite this stalemate in the deployment of forces, be approved and some not. This is not a flawless outcome, but it is a modus vivendi.

[Martinkova] Are you not concerned, for example, about the fate of social reform? It will be enough for the social democrats to submit a draft amendment to the social laws.

[Klaus] I do not believe the Social Democratic Party would submit such a proposal the moment it ceases to be a completely opposition party.

[Martinkova] In your opinion, how has the situation arisen in which only one in three people agrees with ODS policy?

[Klaus] The fact that one in three agrees with ODS policy is not a defeat in a country where there are more political parties. I would quietly convert this into the phrase "every third person." The votes we have won, including those of the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, are the same as four years ago. We have achieved our potential of approximately 45 percent of the vote.

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This is not a defeat. The people who voted for us four years ago also voted for us now. But, this year, fewer votes were forfeited, and they were won by the opposition.

[Martinkova] Is this a warning for the right?

[Klaus] Certainly. But, at the same time, this indicates that there are not so many reservoirs for increasing the number of votes. However, there is one reservoir here: More and more people will become aware of the obvious effects of the transformation process and the initiated economic growth. These people will represent this potential reservoir of right-wing voters.

[Martinkova] What about early elections?

[Klaus] I do not consider them to be a sensible alternative. I do not believe that the voters would change their minds from day to day, that more of them would go to the polls; rather, I am concerned that fewer of them would go to the polls. I do not believe that the political parties would alter their strategies. I do not feel that this would be a solution.

[Martinkova] Uncertainty prevails among the public. When will the way out start to take shape?

[Klaus] You have to give the parties a chance to size up the situation. Not only the chairmen and deputy chairmen can make the decisions. We, for example, are convening an extraordinary ODS Executive Council meeting for Tuesday [4 June], and I am convinced that the same will happen in the other parties. This is the closest intermediary step toward a solution.

Czech Republic: CSSD Head Views New Coalition Prospects

AU0406093696 Prague PRAVO in Czech 3 Jun 96 pp 1, 6

[Interview with CSSD Chairman Milos Zeman by Alexandr Mitrofanov in Prague on 2 June: "We Are Willing To Consider a Government With the ODA, the People's Party, and With the People Around Zieleniec"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mitrofanov] One of your alternatives of the new government allegedly is that you would come to terms with—according to you—the rational people from the KDU-CSL [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party], ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance], and even—that is something new—the ODS [Civic Democratic Party], but without Vaclav Klaus. Is it true?

[Zeman] It is a somewhat simplified view. I am willing to consider the possibility that the ODS is not a one-man party and that a rationally thinking group may exist there. Nevertheless, the fundamental basis on which we stand is very simple: It is the duty of Social Democrats to contribute to the stability of this state and the continuous development toward Western Europe. The greatest danger to this development is today the arrogant power policy implemented by the ODS. The time has come to seek an agreement of all reasonable politicians, an agreement that would bring about a government that would make it possible to span a certain period of transition.

[Mitrofanov] For how long?

[Zeman] I do not believe that such a government should necessarily have the mandate for the entire four years. It could be limited to two years because 1998 is the year for local elections. In two years, the citizens should once again weigh their trust in the individual parties. Until then, we will insist on the implementation of the fundamental points of the CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] program. These include, above all, in addition to decentralization, a new model for social policy, and we cannot imagine Minister Jindrich Vodicka [minister of labor and social affairs] implementing this model; a new model for housing policy, and we cannot imagine Minister Karel Dyba [minister of economic policy and development] implementing this model; and a new model for security policy, and we cannot imagine Minister Jan Ruml [minister of interior] implementing this model. We also demand as a constituent part of our program that property declarations be adopted that would make it possible to distinguish between wealth generated by work and wealth arising from illegal activities often linked to organized crime. I understand that this frightens some people within the ODS. Nevertheless, I want to believe that it does not frighten all of the people within the ODS.

[Mitrofanov] Does it mean that a minority government with CSSD participation is not acceptable to you?

[Zeman] We would definitely not rule out active CSSD participation in the government. Nevertheless, because I believe that the president cannot give up his constitutional duty to participate in forming the new government, it is up to him to talk with the chairmen of all of the parliamentary political parties to seek common points and define the differences. On this basis, then, the president should present his conclusions. I repeat that the CSSD clearly defined its limits regarding the structure of the coalition government.

[Mitrofanov] What would the government be like, in which there would be, in addition to the CSSD, the KDU-CSL, and ODA, people from the ODS?

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[Zeman] Under no circumstances could the prime minister of such a hypothetical government come from the ranks of the ODS, which has sufficiently demonstrated its arrogance when it comes to power. It is in the interest of the country's stability that we do not insist on a Social Democrat becoming the prime minister.

[Mitrofanov] So it would be Josef Lux.

[Zeman] I believe that this variant is not theoretically impossible.

[Mitrofanov] Is it not against your electoral promises to appear in the government next to the ODS?

[Zeman] We would be in the government only with the more rational part of the ODS and not with the part that discredited the ODS and brought about the justified protests of the citizens.

[Mitrofanov] Who belongs to the rational part of the ODS?

[Zeman] Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, for instance, is one of them.

[Mitrofanov] Do you believe his influence in the ODS is strong enough to cause a split in the party?

[Zeman] I want neither to bring about a split in the ODS nor to interfere in the party's internal affairs. It is a matter for the ODS to decide on how much the leader benefits or harms the party.

[Mitrofanov] Would you rule out the possibility of a minority government of the CSSD and the KDU-CSL with tacit support of the KSCM [Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia] and the Republicans?

[Zeman] I do not believe that the KSCM or the SPR-RSC [Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia] could give us any real support after we have clearly stated that we would not form a coalition government with them.

[Mitrofanov] Tacit support.

[Zeman] O.K., tacit support is real support. It is based on the fact that these two parties represent the extreme poles of our political spectrum. It would not be advisable to depend on any—that is, even tacit support—from these two parties.

[Mitrofanov] There is also another alternative: A minority government could be formed from the old-new coalition, and the CSSD could be a strong opposition.

[Zeman] This variant would be connected with several specific conditions. First, no ODS member could head such a government. Second, it would have to be a government that would promise in its policy to fulfill the essential items of our program as, for instance, the decentralization of the state or the separation of the pension funds from the state budget. Third, the CSSD would have to have a genuine opportunity to control the work of this government, and that through both the parliament and other supervisory institutions. Simply, the rule would cease to be valid that the opposition is doomed to the role of an almost silent spectator without influence. For myself, I believe that the decisive electoral battle will take part in 1998. If the government of the present coalition continues—I would point out that, to have such a government, it needs to corrupt just two republican deputies—the citizens would soon sober up from the illusions of decency of some government parties, the strongest one, in particular. At any rate, our point of departure is that the CSSD does not want to enter the government at any cost. If we had the opportunity to implement our program in the government, we would join it. If we did not have this opportunity, we would remain a strong opposition.

[Mitrofanov] Which of the two aforementioned alternatives of the distribution of political power does the CSSD prefer?

[Zeman] The alternative, which puts the interests of the state above those of a party, is the one for us. Under no circumstances would we want to jeopardize the stability of the state, its future development, the orientation toward Europe-wide integration. This criterion will certainly be decisive in our final decisionmaking.

[Mitrofanov] Given either of these two alternatives, what representation on the board of the Chamber of Deputies will the CSSD seek?

[Zeman] It is a matter of further talks. It would be good if all of the parliamentary parties were represented in the parliament proportionally because we consider this a common democratic rule. We also consider it normal for the CSSD to have the opportunity of exercising consistent and effective parliamentary control in case the government attempted to abuse its situation and betray the agreed-upon principles.

[Mitrofanov] Would you ask for the chairmanship of the parliament?

[Zeman] I would not rule it out.

[Mitrofanov] What place in the parliamentary structures do you anticipate for yourself?

[Zeman] That is the last thing on my mind. It is a well known fact that I am the person who, even at the time of the historical success of the CSSD, offered his head because he was 3 percent short of winning the elections.

[Mitrofanov] It is openly rumored in Lidovy Dum [CSSD headquarters] that your head will not be ac-

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cepted. So, how do you intend to act in the parliament—as a rank and file deputy, CSSD chairman, or will you aspire to a higher post like chairman or deputy chairman of the Chamber?

[Zeman] It is a very premature question. I am very tired after the intense election campaign. I want to rest. If such a post is offered to me or I am asked to accept it, I will do so.

[Mitrofanov] How would you assess the conduct of Vaclav Klaus after the announcement of the preliminary election results?

[Zeman] I believe as a man who could not bear his defeat, and a real man must always be able to bear defeat. I am really sorry that he did not come to the TV Debate [program] on Sunday.

[Mitrofanov] Did you expect such an electoral success by the CSSD, and, if so, on what did you base your expectations?

[Zeman] I have constantly and repeatedly stated in all interviews that I consider it our minimum goal to obtain 25 percent of votes statewide and 30 percent in northern Moravia. The actual outcome is 26.5 percent and 34 percent, respectively. On the other hand, I had hoped to get 3 more percent, and we were apparently deprived of these 3 percent by the ambitious Pensioners' Movement, which did not make it into the parliament and thereby jeopardized the interests of the pensioners, which Social Democracy protects in its program. I based my expectations on the analysis of the trends in this country and on a gamble on the intelligence of the voters.

[Mitrofanov] You mentioned that you are still tired. A very demanding period of talks is beginning. When do you intend to take a vacation?

[Zeman] I certainly will not allow the date of my vacation to hinder the successful conclusion of the coalition talks. Personal matters will have to wait a while. I only hope it will not take long.

[Mitrofanov] How do you feel now?

[Zeman] As soon as there is new work before me, I feel recharged. So those who assign new work to me are actually stimulating me.

Czech Republic: PM, Lux on Opposition Leader's 'Demands'

LD0306203496 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has spoken to Czech Radio about the statement by Milos Zeman that he cannot accept a government coalition headed by the Civic Democratic Party.

[Begin Klaus recording] Mr. Zeman has been making rude statements for years. I must remind him that he did not win this election. When he describes what he will or will not accept, he should use a quieter tone of voice and not such strong words. [end recording]

Josef Lux, the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party has also spoken about Milos Zeman's demands:

[Begin Lux recording] We can all count, and, therefore, we all know that 99 is not 101 and that, if the minority government is to function, it is necessary to have the support of some opposition parties. I think we all have ruled out any talks with the communists or republicans or have accepted their support in any, including tacit, form. In this way, the sum of possibilities is almost exhausted. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Lux on Options for Government Formation

LD0306154596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The chairmen of the parties that won most of the votes in the parliamentary elections are holding separate meetings with President Vaclav Havel today. Jitka Kucerova reports from Prague Castle:

[Kucerova] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has said that, of all of the options under consideration, there is one that looks promising. However, he did not elaborate. Josef Lux, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] said, though, that this is no (?empty move), but a challenge for politicians to find a possible solution. He said:

[begin Lux recording] Although the options are not infinite, there are nevertheless several possibilities—new elections, the creation of a grand coalition, a minority government with the support of part of the opposition, to name but a few.

In my view, the country would not benefit from new elections. The KDU-CSL will not participate in the majority government. This is a matter for those who are able to form a majority. We feel that it is possible to form a minority government by looking for ways of gaining the support of at least part of the opposition on matters of key importance. [end recording] [passage omitted]

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Czech Republic: Foreign Policy Implications of Elections

AU0306195896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Jun 96 p 4

["Analysis" by Lubos Palata: "The Two Strongest Parties Have To Cooperate in Foreign Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The election results will not mean a change in the orientation of the Czech Republic's foreign policy, but will spoil considerably its hitherto international status.

It would have been impossible to expect a change in the orientation of our diplomacy even in the event of a clear CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] victory because the policy differences between Zeman's party and the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] in this sphere were not major. It could be said that, in the past two years, Czech foreign policy has become a matter of consensual decisionmaking. Incidentally, Minister Zieleniec has described the attainment of this situation as the most important result of his four years in office.

It would only be possible to anticipate a fundamental shift in Prague's orientation toward entry into the European Union and NATO in the event of the participation in the government of Sladek's republicans and the communists, which both the CSSD and the ODS have categorically ruled out.

This statement, however, does nothing to alter the fact that the postelection stalemate and, consequently, the domestic political instability represent a threat to the most important objective of our diplomacy—that is, rapid integration into the North Atlantic alliance and the European Union. As, by the way, Josef Zieleniec stated on his election posters, diplomatic successes are based on domestic political successes and, to a great extent, on the image our country creates abroad. And this very image of a stable, rapidly reforming state may be endangered by subsequent developments.

As far as NATO in particular is concerned, the next few months will be decisive as our and Western diplomats have said many times in the recent past.

The political scientists agree that, from a strategic point of view, the Czech Republic is relatively insignificant. In Prague's case, domestic political stability was what gave it, along with Warsaw, a chance of membership in the alliance as early as the next few years. Many months of a conceivable power vacuum or a nonfunctional minority government would be, at a time of culminating diplomatic negotiations, the very worst that could happen.

The situation is similar to the issue of our entry into the European Union, although there is, admittedly, more breathing space here. The negotiations on the conditions for membership should begin within a year, however, and it is obvious to the experts that the nonexistence of a stable government with a clear strategy would be a major problem here, too.

The current situation places a considerable question mark over the approval of the Czech-German declaration because the CSSD has already given notice that an apology for the crimes of the wild transfer does not, in its opinion, belong in the document. And, in the event of the possibility of imminent early elections, neither the ODS nor the CSSD would obviously be willing—as recently—to endorse anything that could lose them even 1 percent of the vote.

By all appearances then, a minority government or imminent elections will, to a certain extent, disqualify Prague from the international negotiations as a reliable partner. Incidentally, Vaclav Klaus behaved in a similar fashion toward Moravcik's "transitional" Slovak Government.

Despite this, the affinity between the foreign political programs of the ODS, the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, on the one hand, and the CSSD, on the other, means that, if a grand coalition is not formed, there is a chance that its principles will be honored at least in the foreign policy sphere. The social democrats should be aware of the increased responsibility the elections have given them. Holding up the Republic's incorporation into the Western structures would, incidentally, imply a "fundamental threat to the state," which Zeman has named as a condition for cooperation with the ODS.

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Slovakia: Meciar Statement on Districts Clarified

AU3105184196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 31 May 96 p 2

[Report by TASR: "On Vladimir Meciar's Statement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Information Department of the Slovak Government Office has clarified [spresnil] Vladimir Meciar's statement while meeting OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] High Commissioner [for Ethnic Minorities] Max van der Stoel on 23 May 1996: "Speaking about the new electoral districts being contemplated, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar stressed that the Slovak Republic was interested in the formation of electoral districts in which the Hungarian ethnic minority would be dominant, so that its appropriate proportional representation in the Slovak Republic National Council is guaranteed."

Slovakia: SNS's Slota on Disagreements Within Cabinet

AU0406120996 Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak 3 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota by Peter Skorna; place and date not given: "Termination of Monochromaticity Will Help the Matter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Skorna] At an extraordinary session of the Slovak National Party [SNS] Central Council Presidium and the SNS National Council of the Slovak Republic [NASR] Deputies' Club [in Zilina] last weekend, you adopted a resolution that you will demand that the NASR Special Supervisory Body [OKO] for the Slovak Information Service be expanded with representatives of the opposition, that the National Property Fund [FNM] be restructured, and the Supreme Control Office [NKU] of the Slovak Republic be asked to check certain outputs from the FNM. What made you resort to this approach, when the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in particular has not indicated any interest in the demands you have stated?

[Slota] The addition of the opposition to the NASR OKO and the Slovak FNM will only make things better. After all, why should these bodies be monochromatic? The Slovak NKU should have some control over the FNM output. After all, in this state, there is control over the president, prime minister, and government. Why shouldn't there be control over the FNM too? Like our coalition partners from the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], we in the SNS have some exceptions to the FNM Executive Committee's decisions.

[Skorna] Are these demands going to cause a certain tension between you and the HZDS?

[Slota] So long as we behave properly to each other in the government coalition no tension should arise. Tension appear only when one partner believes he is more important than the others.

[Skorna] Have you consulted the ZRS about your demands?

[Slota] Of course, we have. Although we originally held the same view as the HZDS on the privatization of the financial institutions, for instance, we changed our position after certain of the FNM's steps and leaned towards the ZRS. To pacify society and the political surface, it will be better if the financial institutions controlled by the FNM were not privatized but remained under FNM administration.

[Skorna] Would you agree that since the HZDS is eminently interested in the privatization of the financial institutions, it will push you "to the wall" until you and the ZRS give up your demands?

[Slota] In no circumstances would the SNS sell itself because of the financial institutions. As long as all three partners in the coalition approach matters seriously, no one will push anyone "to the wall." In the event that someone initiates the aforementioned steps, the SNS will act according to the Slovak proverb: "Like the call, so the echo."

[Skorna] What made you express your dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's remarks about the creation of independent Hungarian constituencies in Slovakia?

[Slota] The coalition consists of three partners. Mr. Meciar may be the prime minister but he should consult his coalition partners about such fundamental domestic issues that have an impact abroad. He did not do so in this instance. I consider his comments on the monochromatic Hungarian constituencies a tragedy and quite unacceptable for the SNS.

Slovakia: Politicians View SNS 'Rebellion' Against HZDS

AU0406114396 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 3 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by Zita Sujova, Julius Gembicky, Robert Zitnansky, and CTK: "Reactions to Slovak National Party Statement: Not Just an Open Rebellion but Also Calculations With Vladimir Meciar's Illness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NARODNA OBRODA approached several politicians to solicit their reactions to the statement issued by the expanded Slovak National Party [SNS] Central Board Presidium on Saturday [1 June].

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Jan Cuper, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] deputy, confirmed that although he is a member of the leadership of the HZDS club of deputies, the SNS has not come up so far with similar demands at any joint session of the coalition clubs of deputies. Asked how he explains the fact that it came up with them now—at a time when HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar is on sick leave—Jan Cuper said that "it is the right of each coalition partner to set conditions, only these must not border on political blackmail because the coalition agreement would not be complied with in that case, and the coalition would then be unfunctional." He added, however, that for the time being he knows nothing about anything of that sort happening. Regarding the SNS's reaction to Vladimir Meciar's statement about purely Hungarian electoral districts, Jan Cuper said that these could be realized only through an amendment to the election law. "But I do not know anything about this, and therefore cannot comment on how the prime minister meant it," he noted. Jan Cuper considers it unnecessary to call a meeting [of parliament] in order to subject the National Property Fund [FNM] to control because the Supreme Inspection Office [NKU] can only check on state enterprises and the state budget, and changing the NKU's powers would require an amendment to the Constitution. Jan Cuper did not want to comment on the SNS's proposal to halt the privatization of financial institutions because he is no financial expert. As for the SNS proposal for including the opposition in OKO [special parliamentary body for supervising the secret services], the representation of the opposition in OKO has been contemplated for some time, even within the HZDS, Jan Cuper said.

Eduard Kukan: I Was Personally Surprised by the SNS's Openness

According to Democratic Union [DU] Deputy Chairman Eduard Kukan, the SNS statement is another proof of centrifugal tendencies within the coalition. "Personally, I was surprised by the openness with which the SNS declares its objections," he said. Kukan believes that the SNS's above efforts must be seen in context with Prime Minister Meciar's longer absence from the political scene. "Apparently, this is also the SNS's preparation for a possible solution to the crisis that is looming in the government coalition," he added.

According to Viliam Vaskovic, the SNS Seeks Not Control but Property

National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Deputy Viliam Vaskovic, former vice president of the FNM Presidium and chairman of the FNM Executive Committee, views the SNS's proposals to enforce effective control of the FNM by the NKU, to halt the process of privatizing financial institutions, and to expand FNM bodies as this party's reaction to the personnel changes in the management bodies of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] a.s. Bratislava. "They are not in the least concerned about privatization being put under control; it is only a reaction to the fact that they lost the possibility to influence the operation of one of the important financial institutions. It is a farce; the HZDS apparently did not satisfy their privatization appetite. If they were not satisfied with the course of privatization thus far, they could have left the government coalition, instead of approving in parliament all the laws that have brought about the present situation. They fully share responsibility for what has happened in privatization to date," Viliam Vaskovic told NARODNA OBRODA. "The nonapproval of the amendment to the law on bankruptcy and settlement, too, was a consequence of their actions. However, the most interesting thing about this is the public accusation of the coalition partner, the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], which bears full responsibility for privatization because the privatization minister and the president of the FNM Presidium are both ZRS people," Viliam Vaskovic added.

Peter Weiss Sees Growing Conflict in the Government Coalition

Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Deputy Chairman Peter Weiss evaluated the SNS statement as a clear sign of growing conflicts within the government coalition and, at the same time, as an expression of the SNS's dissatisfaction with the fact that the HZDS moved the SNS's interests regarding the privatization of large financial institutions aside. The SDL has repeatedly proposed the adoption of measures that the SNS is publicly proposing now—drafting a bill on subjecting privatization to NKU control, halting the privatization of large banks, and expanding OKO. According to Peter Weiss, FNM bodies need not be expanded, but they should be held accountable by parliament and subsequently replaced.

Frantisek Gaulieder Is Planning To Carry Out Inspection in the Slovak Information Service [SIS]

HZDS Deputy and OKO member Frantisek Gaulieder considers the SNS's proposal to expand OKO completely logical because "SNS Chairman Jan Slota sees (as a fellow member of OKO) how this supervisory body operates in relation to the SIS." He did not rule out that in the near future he and Jan Slota might carry out a joint inspection in the SIS "even beyond the framework of the OKO resolution." He refused to comment

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on the other parts of the SNS statement, because he is not a member of the HZDS leadership.

Jan Carnogursky Allows for Repentance

In an interview for CTK, Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Chairman Jan Carnogursky reacted to the SNS statement with the words: "Belated repentance is better than no repentance. If the SNS were to enlarge the number of bodies that it wants to have complemented with opposition representatives to include also the councils for radio and television broadcasting, I can imagine that we would support the convening of an extraordinary NRSR meeting," Jan Carnogursky said.

In the political lobbies, the SNS move is being spoken of not only as an open "rebellion" against the HZDS, but there are also "calculations with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's illness."

Slovakia: Kovac Again Refutes Meciar's Charges

AU3105190196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 31 May 96 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Julius Gembicky; place and date not given: "M. Kovac: There Is No Basis to Claims of Mr. Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Numerous constitutional officials complained last year that they had a feeling as if they were bugged. Still at the time, the work of the Slovak Information Service (SIS) was discussed in specific terms in the State Defense Council (ROS). This body tasked the SIS, among other things, with intelligence protection of the constitutional officials and representatives of the bodies of the state power and with obtaining information on the activities of domestic pressure and interest groups, trade union, professional, and civic lobbies with radical opinions and demands. "These very tasks," Slovak President Kovac said in an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, "violate the law on the SIS as this law does not make it possible for the secret services to perform intelligence protection of constitutional officials and bodies of the state power."

"These facts," Kovac said, "were the reason for my turning to SIS Director Ivan Lexa on 13 September 1995 with a letter. I did not have to mark it top secret, but because I expected the answer to contain some classified facts, I myself denoted it top secret correspondence beforehand. I did not ask the SIS director for any specific data about the collection of information on constitutional officials. I only wanted to know under what circumstances does the SIS collect information about them, and whether this collection of information is within the limits of the law and the assignment by the ROS regarding the constitutional officials. I received an answer, however," the president said, "which contained information about what the SIS had collected about me and my family by then, although it was in violation of the law on the SIS. When I learned this, I wrote a letter to the prosecutor general (GP) on 17 October 1995, in which I reported to Michal Valo the fact that this SIS activity violates the law. I wrote that as the supreme constitutional official, I am concerned about the illicit activities of the SIS, which carry a high degree of social danger. Therefore I asked," President Kovac said, "for a thorough investigation of this petition of mine. I believed that I would be informed within a month regarding the relevant measures on the part of the GP. This correspondence was inspected in the Office of the Slovak President (KP) also by the NASR [National Council of the Slovak Republic] Special Supervisory Body (OKO) under the leadership of Igor Urban. I showed them all that had been collected about myself and my family and Lexa's classified answer to my letter."

President Kovac added that his petition to the GP was rejected by the authorities. Nevertheless, the KP attorney added to the petition by the head of state names of the persons whom Ivan Lexa illegally questioned in the seat of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in Tomasikova Street in Bratislava, although former SIS Director Mitro did not free them of the vow of silence at the time. "That is in brief the entire story of my alleged abuse of secret services, of which Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar accused me in the regular Friday interview for Slovak Radio," President Kovac said. "I still am terrified by the way the SIS understands the tasks assigned to it by the ROS. Despite everything, I have never learned from the SIS director whether or not the constitutional officials are wiretapped under the pretext of their own interest. For this reason, I wrote another letter to the SIS director on 20 September 1995, in which I asked for information concerning the circumstances on which specific persons, and to what extent does the SIS apply the information-technical equipment, and whether Article 12 of Law on the SIS was not violated in the period from 1 January to 20 September 1995."

Kovac received from Lexa a reply to this letter stating that the SIS cannot provide the required information to him because it is not important for the work and decisions of the president of the Slovak Republic. "So, for whom does the SIS collect the information if it is not for the president, parliament chairman, or the prime minister?" Kovac asked a rhetorical question. "Is it perhaps meant only for internal needs of the SIS staff? Why should only the prime minister be given some

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important information, and not the president?" Kovac added.

"If I declassify my correspondence, i.e., the aforementioned letters to the SIS director, Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, who did not even bother to reply, it will come out that it was nothing of which I would have to be ashamed or for what I would have to answer to someone for exceeding my powers."

To the NARODNA OBRODA question of whether the president has information regarding the misuse of the secret services, of which Prime Minister Meciar accused him, Kovac answered that nothing to this effect has ever been proven. This includes the suspicion on the part of Meciar that four people from the former SIS worked on his case. Former SIS Director Mitro also filed charges with the GP regarding this claim by the prime minister. To date, the president has not received any information from either the GP or the Investigation Department of the Slovak Police Corps about being a part of the SIS work, and no prosecution has been initiated against the former director, despite a year having passed since that time. "Hence, the claims made by Mr. Meciar have no real basis," Kovac added.

To another question of whether he knew about the abduction of his son or thwarted and influenced the course of the investigation, moreover in connection with people suspected of criminal activities, as he was accused by Prime Minister Meciar, the president said that it is a total nonsense, and an expression of maximum cynicism. "I know how my son looked when I visited him at the police station in Hainburg, at 0230 in the morning, the night they kidnapped him," Slovak President Kovac concluded the interview.

Slovakia: More on Kovac's Comments After Suing Meciar

AU3105190896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 31 May 96 p 3

[Report by Martin Krno on President Michal Kovac's replies to journalists' questions in the Primate's Palace in Bratislava on 29 May: "President Reacts to Prime Minister's Accusations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we reported in yesterday's issue of PRAVDA, Michal Kovac filed criminal charges against Vladimir Meciar, doctor of law, on suspicion of multiple violation of the Penal Code in the latter's statements in the Friday, 24 May 1996, interview for Slovak Radio's Radiozurnal program. Today we return to the president's replies to questions put to him on this occasion by journalists during a meeting in the Primate's Palace in Bratislava Wednesday [29 May] evening. [passage omitted]

Asked by PRAVDA about the contents of his letter to the interior minister, the president replied that he had asked Ludovit Hudek for information about the outcome of the general police verification of the Democratic Union [DU] petition sheets. When the chief of the interior department refused to provide the data, Kovac replied that he would be content with a single piece of information—how many valid signatures had been registered. It should not be a problem to find this out, given that the police know how many signatures were verified and how many forged signatures were ascertained. But the president did not receive a reply even to this question. Later he learned that that government had filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, according to which he supposedly exceeded his powers by assigning tasks to the minister, although he only has the right to the submission of a report. He also asked Hudek—again to no avail—for information about whether, within the framework of intelligence protection of some constitutional officials, the Police Corps had used any operative-technical devices. [passage omitted]

Last Wednesday [22 May] Slovak Television [STV] broadcast Lexa's entire speech to Parliament. A substantial part of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] director's report on the fulfillment of SIS tasks was devoted to the head of state. Kovac therefore asked the STV, as a public corporation, to broadcast the following day a statement by the President's Office that rejected Lexa's accusations. "In his speech Lexa demonstrated that the SIS is engaged in activities that are not in conformity with the Law on the SIS. He revealed that its activity has been reoriented toward search for the so-called internal enemy. This clearly bears out that the SIS has slid to the positions of the former StB [communist-era secret service]."

Commenting on the prime minister's statement that, as long as Michal Kovac is head of state there would not be peace in Slovakia, the president said that Meciar "is not able to respect the results of democratic processes regarding the election and appointment of constitutional officials." According to Kovac, these practices are reminiscent of the times of the previous regime. He sees a solution to the tense situation in the need to search for ways of resuming communication among constitutional officials, which is inevitable for the proper functioning of our state.

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Slovakia: Daily Comments on Kovac vs. Meciar Lawsuit

AU3105150996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 31 May 96 p 9

[Commentary by Jan Fuele: "Dr. vs. Engineer, the Prime Minister vs. the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar managed to get away with all of his verbal gaffes unscathed, so to speak, right up until this Wednesday [29 May]. When it seemed once that he would, after all, lose a court case with Vladimir Pavlik, a judge in the Slovak Supreme Court, Dr. Jozef Stefanko, saved the day. He is the same judge who, in explaining his verdict in the Slobodnik versus Feldek dispute, regarded the Hlinka Youth as an innocent and misused organization. The Association of Slovak Judges expelled him from its ranks for "violating the principles of ethics." This was also their assessment of his appearance in the mass media and of the fact that, as a serving judge, he had campaigned for the KSU [Christian Social Union].

Now the president of the republic will probably take the prime minister to court. He has taken exception to the claims made by V. Meciar in an interview for Slovak Radio in which, among other things, he said that the president knew about the planned kidnapping of his son, had thwarted and influenced the investigation, and was involved in the fraud in the Technopol case. At the moment, not only whether the prime minister believes what he says in public, but also whether he can prove it is important. There should be a difference between what he says to the public in a sports hall, what he says to all the citizens of the state on public service radio, and the kind of argumentation an independent court requires.

Thus, the president of the republic and the prime minister have decided to fight a duel. No one else can help them. Public opinion, despite the massive campaign against M. Kovac and his son, has not turned its back on the head of state and the policy of attack has not detracted from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's [HZDS] support. According to results of a poll conducted by the FOCUS agency, 41.4 percent of the respondents would, in a referendum, be opposed to the dismissal of the president of the republic; 28.7 percent would support his dismissal. The HZDS would win the elections. Despite the fact that no one would believe its ditty about "no more quarrels."

In this situation, what can the lawsuit resolve? Nothing or almost nothing. M. Kovac would have to have an extraordinarily strong stomach if he were to submit a complaint against V. Meciar and not be certain of his own conduct in the matters that pertain to it. The prime minister, on the other hand, can be certain that, just as he is capable of believing everything he says—and not only when he gets over his flu—his voters also believe it. If he loses the case, which may last for months, it will be enough to cast doubt on the independence of the court and everything will be all right.

Despite this, the future court case has given Slovakia and the world important information—V. Meciar will no longer extend his hand to M. Kovac, as has been the case with many other politicians previously. Now, it will be enlightening to see who in Slovakia and abroad will extend their hands to the two of them and for what.

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B-H: Germany Expects IFOR To Stay Beyond 'Late December'

AU0406093296 Paris AFP in English 0915 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, June 4 (AFP)—Germany expects the NATO-led peace implementation for Bosnia to stay in the former Yugoslav republic beyond late December, the date set for its withdrawal, German Foreign Ministry official Helmut Schaefer said here Tuesday.

"The withdrawal date until now set for the end of the year (in the Dayton peace accords) cannot stand," he added. "It is too early to talk of a withdrawal date."

Schaefer said IFOR had to await the outcome of the Bosnian elections scheduled for September before deciding how much longer it would have to stay in Bosnia.

But he said he thought the IFOR contingent could be scaled down after December 31.

B-H: Izetbegovic Briefs Reporters on Geneva Talks

AU0306190696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 3 Jun 96

[Report by Stevo Latinovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following yesterday's meeting in Geneva between U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the delegations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, led by Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and Slobodan Milosevic respectively, the president of the Presidency of our country has held a news conference. Stevo Latinovic reports:

[Latinovic] Addressing the reporters, President Izetbegovic said that the one-day meeting in Geneva was attended by a delegation consisting of Hasan Muratovic, head of the republican government; Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation; Miro Lazovic, chairman of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic; UN Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbegovic; and Kasim Begic, member of the Election Commission.

Noting that he had held separate talks with Christopher, Milosevic, and Franjo Tudjman, the president of the Presidency said the following about the Geneva talks:

[Izetbegovic] A large part of the conference was spent on agreeing on the text of the joint statement. This lasted over four hours, (?especially) the part dealing with the elections. Regarding the elections, we stressed the principle [words indistinct] free and fair elections. We said that we have nothing against the elections being held in (?September) under these conditions. However, we warned that we take the view that at this moment the conditions for elections have not been met in any way, and that it appears to us that they will not be met by this (?date). I must remind you that it is not we who will call the elections, but (?OSCE) according to the Dayton agreement.

It is important that the resolve to carry out all the points of the Dayton agreement has been reaffirmed. Readiness of all sides to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal has been confirmed. So has the provision according to which those who have been (?indicted) by the Hague Tribunal cannot hold public posts. Measures for free movement as the basic condition [words indistinct] to hold free and fair elections has been confirmed.

[Latinovic] The next portion of President Izetbegovic's speech referred to the problem of refugees.

[Izetbegovic] The agreement by five countries signed a few days ago between Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Slovenia, and Croatia was welcomed. We also discussed free access to the media. We also discussed the problem of Brcko. The Serb side was asked to name its arbiter as soon as possible. The United States has offered its good services with regard to the arbitration on Brcko.

One section of the talks referred to the Vienna talks on arms control. We harmonized some of our views and expressed readiness to cooperate fully so that the agreement on arms control could be concluded by the given deadline, 11 June. We drew attention to the fact that the money that has been promised at the recent conferences in (?Brussels) and elsewhere, either in the form of loans or donations, is arriving slowly in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We raised the issue of construction of the Gorazde road with the U.S. side, and were given assurances that the construction would start this week.

I had one-on-one talks with Mr. Milosevic and the members of our delegation [words indistinct]

[Latinovic] In separate talks with Warren Christopher, President Izetbegovic said:

[Izetbegovic] I said that the elections held in democratic conditions lead to the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in that case perhaps concern only Bosnia-Herzegovina, above all. Imposed elections, without the fulfillment of these conditions, if they are held at all—I think that the Bosniak parties would boycott them—they would lead to the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is certain. And this would not only stop with Bosnia-Herzegovina. This would be something that could affect the world. Such elections would

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represent a dangerous precedent because the international community, led by the United States, would endorse for the first time, or be the sponsor of such undemocratic elections.

So, I think that Mr. Christopher has understood these arguments well. Mr. Christopher stated at the same time that the United States would under no conditions accept the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Latinovic] The talks with Slobodan Milosevic indicate [words indistinct].

[Izetbegovic] We agreed with Mr. Milosevic that our delegation pays a visit. This delegation would discuss setting up (?telecommunications) and telephone links, railroad links, and making initial steps with regard to trade. This delegation will probably leave for Belgrade not this week, but next week.

[Latinovic] One of the journalists' questions referred to the speculations by some [words indistinct] that some Western officials have stated that the elections will be held even if the criminals Karadzic and Mladic run as candidates. Have Christopher and Milosevic given guarantees that this would not happen?

[Izetbegovic] I think that these are only speculations. I think that no serious person, no one responsible in the Western world would publicly say that the elections could be held (then) as the conditions for democratic elections (?do not exist). On the other hand, the United States and all other parties present said that the elections could only be held if the necessary conditions from the Dayton agreement are secured. We know what these conditions are.

B-H: Plavsic Replaced by Buha at Geneva Meeting

LD0406111296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0910 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Jun (SRNA)—Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, did not attend the meeting in Geneva as planned because on the night before the departure the office of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic informed her that she was not a member of the delegation. Sources close to the Belgrade government confirmed this report to SRNA.

Citing sources from the FRY Interior Ministry, the DNEVNI TELEGRAF newspaper adds that in place of Plavsic it was Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha who travelled to Geneva to the meeting of the Dayton Agreement signatories.

Serb Republic Vice President Nikola Koljevic did not wish to comment on the meeting because, as he said, "he did not know what was happening in Geneva."

B-H: High-Level Delegation To Hold Talks in Belgrade

AU0306162996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As stated by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a news conference today, a high-level delegation of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina will pay an official visit to Belgrade next week. In Belgrade, the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation will discuss the possibilities to set up PTT [post, telegraph, telephone] links, railroad communications, and trade.

President Izetbegovic agreed on this visit during the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic at the meeting in Geneva yesterday.

B-H: Serbs To Attend Florence Summit as Separate Group

LD3105161196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 31 May (SRNA)—Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic reached an agreement in Pale today that the representatives of the Serb Republic will take part in the summit in Florence, to be held on 13-14 June to discuss the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement, as a separate delegation.

After his meeting with the political advisers to Carl Bildt, Lois Sell, and Pauline Neville-Jones, Klickovic explained that the Serb Republic delegation will have "its own place card at the conference table."

"The representatives of the Muslim-Croat Federation will have theirs and the representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have his own desk," the prime minister added.

"It has been agreed that in Florence we will discuss key points of the repatriation—the return of refugees and displaced persons—reconstruction, and development," Klickovic said. [passage omitted]

B-H: OSCE's Frowick States Elections 'on Track'

AU0306164196 Paris AFP in English 1606 GMT 3 Jun 96

[Report by Tessa Fras]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 3 (AFP)—Bosnia moved closer to elections Monday as the top

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OSCE official in the country said only renewed fighting would stop polls going ahead after Balkan leaders pledged their commitment to the process.

Robert Frowick, head of the Bosnia mission of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which is organising the ballot, said problems remained but the electoral process was firmly on track. He announced what he said were unprecedented measures to ensure the election went ahead free and unfettered across the country.

He was speaking after the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia meeting with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Geneva on Sunday vowed their commitment to elections by the Dayton accord deadline of mid-September.

Frowick will say later in June if conditions exist for elections to go ahead, but he told a news conference only a "gross serious manifest deterioration of the situation we have now, in particular if we have a resumption of conflict," would delay them.

He said 1,200 OSCE observers would monitor the ballot at some 4,000 polling stations while NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) troops and UN police would provide security. "I do not know of any other election in history with that much international control over the procedure," he added.

However the timetable was tight and more time would have been desirable. "It is a very severely limited timeframe. We can't expect IFOR to stay here in its full strength until it becomes an ideal situation. We have a limited timeframe in which to do our best."

Frowick said that while the situation was better than six months ago, only limited progress had been made on democratisation. In particular there were problems with freedom of movement, association and expression, he said, and the "ultra-nationalist" mentality of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the Croats in the divided southern city of Mostar.

Another worry was the influence of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. He should be "expunged" from his position, Frowick said. The hardline Karadzic has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia and is barred from holding public office. "A process of democratisation has started, however painful," Frowick said, while admitting "monumental difficulties" ahead.

In Geneva, Western powers pressured Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to try to get him to remove Karadzic from power. A final document signed by the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian presidents and Christopher did not mention Karadzic, but it did contain a pledge on elections by mid-September.

Afterwards Milosevic, speaking on Yugoslav television, said it was clear all sides were ready to exert maximum efforts toward establishing preconditions for successful elections such as freedom of movement and political activity.

"I am convinced all sides will do their best for these preconditions to be established, and I believe that under these conditions, the elections will be held on time, in the manner envisaged by the Dayton agreement," he said. "I... think that I may freely say that this meeting has given an additional stimulus to the successful realization of the Dayton agreement," he added.

Despite the optimistic noises, elections due in Mostar on June 30 are beset with uncertainty. One unknown is how displaced people and refugees, particularly from the Serb community, will be able to cast their votes in the town, divided between Croats and Moslems and administered by the European Union.

"It is hard to imagine whole coach-loads of refugees and displaced people will be able to cross unhindered zones controlled by their former enemies to get to the polling stations," a senior European official said on condition of anonymity.

B-H: Izetbegovic Doubts Possibility of Free, Fair Elections

AU0306174196 Paris AFP in English 1650 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 3 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic expressed doubts Monday over whether "free and fair" elections could take place as planned later this year, despite the optimism of the United States.

Izetbegovic denied he had come under pressure to accept the mid-September date for the elections, a timetable reaffirmed in Geneva on Sunday during a summit of Dayton peace accord signatories. "We were under no pressure," he said. "There was no need to pressure us since we are not against holding the elections in September."

"Our opinion is the elections will be useful if they are free and fair. The problem lies with the different assessment of the conditions," he said. "The American side are more optimistic than we are. They are optimistic that the conditions for the election will be met, we are in this regard somewhat pessimistic." Although the election date has yet to be fixed, "it is clear that the American side is in favour of holding the elections in September," Izetbegovic added.

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Earlier, Robert Frowick, the top Bosnia official of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said only a resumption of fighting would derail the elections.

Ahead of the Geneva meeting the president had insisted that hard-line Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had to appear before the UN War Crimes Tribunal to answer genocide charges for Bosnia's elections to be truely democratic.

In the event of the "miracle" of Karadzic's arrest, along with his military commander Ratko Mladic, "I think the conditions might be met" for the elections to go ahead, Izetbegovic said. However, he added: "I didn't get the impression that we could expect this soon."

B-H: Izetbegovic Stresses Need for Democratic Elections

LD0306223496 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Jun 96

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At a news conference in Sarajevo today Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, spoke about his talks in Geneva:

[Correspondent Esref Hodzic] The talks in Geneva were very intensive and wide-ranging, President Alija Izetbegovic said at the news conference today. [passage omitted]

President Izetbegovic said today that most time in Geneva was spent on drawing up the text of a joint statement, particularly the part referring to elections. In the joint statement the sides confirmed their resolve to implement all points of the Dayton agreement. All expressed their readiness to cooperate with the Hague tribunal and their agreement that those accused of war crimes cannot perform political duties. They also confirmed measures for the freedom of movement as the basis for free elections. In talks on arbitration for Brcko, the Serb side was invited to appoint its arbiter, while the United States offered its good offices for arbitration.

Views have been coordinated in connection with the Vienna talks on arms control, and an agreement in this respect will be signed most probably in June. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation noted the slow influx of donors' money and urged the donors to send the agreed amounts. The United States has promised it will begin building the Gorazde road this week. Most attention, however, was focused on the elections:

[Izetbegovic] "Elections held under democratic conditions lead to the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in that case perhaps concern only Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily. Imposed elections, without these conditions, if they are held at all—I think that the Bosniak parties would boycott them—would lead to the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is certain and would not stop only with Bosnia-Herzegovina. This could have a world-wide effect. Such elections would represent a dangerous precedent because the international community, led by the United States, would for the first time endorse or be the sponsor of such undemocratic elections.

"So, I think that Mr. Christopher has understood these arguments well. Mr. Christopher stated at the same time that the United States will under no circumstances accept the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it will support all efforts conducive to integration."

[Hodzic] In the talks, did you ask for criminals Karadzic and Mladic to be handed over to the Hague tribunal, and what did he reply, was a journalist's question.

[Izetbegovic] "He convinced me that Karadzic has been removed from his post. He did not say he is confident that Karadzic will be handed over to the Hague tribunal. I did not get the impression, talking to others, that this can be expected soon, which does not mean that efforts in that direction are not being made and that this will not happen."

[Hodzic] The Geneva talks lasted until late last night and therefore reports on their outcome were broadcast quite late. This caused speculations in some newspapers; for instance, in connection with the civilian command of the federal army.

[Izetbegovic] "First of all, this is not any sort of agreement with Tudjman. This is the implementation of a provision contained in the Dayton agreement saying that as long as two armies exist in the federation, one army will be commanded by a Bosniak member of the presidency while the other army will be commanded by a Croat member of the presidency. Until elections have been held—which should happen this year—this means the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency and the president of the federation."

[Hodzic] Concluding his comments on the central issue—on the elections—President Izetbegovic said that Bosnia needs elections, but free and democratic elections.

B-H: Electoral Commission Extends Registration Deadline

AU3105182596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The temporary electoral commission has passed a decision extending the registration

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deadline for political parties and independent candidates from 7 to 14 June. The decision was made with the intention of allowing the greatest possible number of parties and candidates to participate in the forthcoming elections.

B-H: OSCE TV Seen as Threat to Election Campaign

AU3105122696 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 96 p 12

[Article by Jasmin Durakovic: "Take as Much as You Want"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last few days the activities related to the creation of the so-called independent television net, whose objective is to cover the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the preelection campaign and later, have been intensified. Around 10 days ago, Carl Bildt once again asked for urgent approval of a budget to an amount of 35 million German marks, the greatest part of which should be used for the television net. At the same time, the officers of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], which is in charge of the conduct of the elections in September, as well as of the later implementation of the peace agreement, have been lobbying on the terrain, in order to get local public support for the project. As could be discovered, they have had talks, which have by no means been gentle, with the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, related to the rental of existing frequencies owned by the state, but also with the representatives of the private media (or, as they are popularly called here, the independent media), so as to get public and concrete professional and technical support in the realization of the project. Yet, there are still many uncertain (and unsaid) things in the air.

As a reminder, not long ago the local public reacted with indignation at the idea of the [creation of the] so-called Bildt television. The reason was that Bildt's project had been worked out without any consultations with the representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the independent media, a project which boiled down to supervision and management from abroad, with cheap use of frequencies, of the local, poor but existing, equipment, and of journalists who would willingly and without reserve join the project that brings "sweet money in cash." All that looked like a cheap sale of what has been left in the telecommunications net and media here.

Lobbying for the Project

This time the lobbying for the television network is being done in a more tactical way, but there is still an impression that it is the same thing, only in a different package. Only that now there are more people involved. At the moment Sarajevo is occupied by various media experts who are here on official missions, and by various alternative groups that are here to sell media wisdom and lessons from a democratic culture. Zdravko Grebo, producer of Radio Zid, says that in the past few months his station has been literally flooded by offers for the professional training of journalists, schools of media expression, seminars, and study tours, so that the question is who will stay here and work. The situation is similar in the majority of the other media. After talks with all sorts of experts for media, politics and the Balkans, the editors of the local media have a bitter impression: An American of Bulgarian origin, Dimiter Dimitrov, OSCE officer responsible for media coverage of the coming elections and the person who is directly engaged in the project of the creation of the television network, behaves in a very arrogant and rather extreme manner, invoking the Dayton Agreement and the political attitude of the United States toward Bosnia in his talks with the representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and of the local media. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been addressed with a categorical demand to allot a frequency for the installation and broadcasting of the independent television network. Otherwise, i.e. if the government does not comply with this proposal, the OSCE will order IFOR [Implementation Force] to establish its net. This, however, is precisely the problem because the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina possesses licenses for around 6,700 various sorts of frequencies which are used, beside the public media like the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the local and private stations, also by the institutions of special national interest (army, police, post, electricity distribution company, and so on). Before the war the Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina had two developed television networks (the first and the second channel), and it had started to develop a third, which was intended to be of local character. A television network implies a program which goes out of one center—in our case, the studio in Sarajevo.

The Media Mastodon in Bosnia

The war has destroyed the Bosnian television network, in the technical sense, so that today the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina broadcasts its program using only one channel and covering only partially the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina through its

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land net. Today the Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina also has three hours of satellite programs. However, Bosnia-Herzegovina has limited possibilities when it to comes to getting new frequencies, so that retaining the existing ones, in the language of politics, is of strategic interest. In their campaign, the OSCE and Mr. Dimitrov have given no decisive answer to anybody as to who the owner of the so-called independent net is. Instead, they tell the stories on the necessity of democratic competition, and offer bait to small private television stations for a sort of partnership in the project.

Bulgarian-American Manners of Mr. Dimitrov

For the time being Adil Kulenovic and his studio 99 appear as the representative of the independent television stations. In the interview given to the Sarajevo-based VECERNJE NOVINE, Mr. Dimitrov mentions the OSCE, the office of Carl Bildt, IFOR, but also INTERNEWS, the U.S. Information Service, the BBC, and some others as participants in the project. There has been some talk about renting a frequency until the time of the elections, but later as well. In the talk with our editor, Mr. Dimitrov mentioned the possibility for the television net to continue to exist afterward as well, this time as a commercial television net. Maybe it is precisely through this that the whole story becomes clearer. Why, for example, would the BBC enter this project? The answer today can only be assumed. One idea could be as follows: The BBC is a house on which the British Government has a strong influence, and Bosnians have many reasons to be embittered about its policy. After all, who has the right to give a mandate to the BBC, and through it to the British Government, to interfere with the preelection campaign?

Amila Omersoftic, the director general of the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina, says that she will not support that silent media colonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but, in any case, she believes that OSCE has taken upon itself the delicate responsibility of control and of media coverage of the elections, and that she hopes that that will help the democratization of the public life not only in Sarajevo, but also in Pale or in Bijeljina. "Through our network we will cover the election campaign in a correct and fair way. All political parties will have equal space in our programs. We will try to calm the language a little bit too. Today hatred is broadcast from Pale, and from Grude, and we will not allow hatred to be scattered between ourselves," Ms. Omersoftic says. The second channel of the Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina is planned to be organized as a network of cantonal televisions, so that the national television house of Bosnia-Herzegovina is against renting the frequencies of this channel, particularly not without a clear situation as to why and to whom it is being rented. On the other hand, opposition parties have not been satisfied with their treatment, and we can daily read in the press about their complaints and objections. Yet, one should not forget that nearly all political parties, including the opposition ones, have refused the mentioned initiative for the creating of Bildt's television, which could be an indication that there is a sort of awareness about the issues of national interest, which must be questioned.

The OSCE representative, Dimiter Dimitrov, at a meeting to which the representatives of the independent media from Sarajevo had been invited, said that the television network would be established whether we want it or not. "Take it or leave it," Mr. Dimitrov said then, in his Bulgarian-American manner, which is already known to the editors from Sarajevo, obviously attempting to be authoritative. Through the Dayton Agreement Bosnia has indeed become a country of limited sovereignty. Now we are already in a position to be threatened with the possibility of limited professional sovereignty. To them it is not important whether they make a pact with the state and its media or if they do so with the so-called independent, i.e. the private media. What is important is to have partners who love money, and who do not want to weary their heads with thoughts about some "needless" details. They are people with a mission to carry out. Does that mean that all of us are now supposed to say: "Take as much as you want!"

B-H: Milosevic Sends Message to SPRS Congress in Banja Luka

AU0106161796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 1 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The First Congress of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic [SPRS] has begun in Banja Luka. At the opening of the congress a message from [Serbian] President Slobodan Milosevic was read to the participants in the congress. The message says the following:

Dear comrades: I send you cordial greetings, with best wishes for the successful work of the congress. I hope that at this congress you begin your initiatives and adopt decisions that will facilitate the unification of all the progressive leftist and democratic forces in the Serb Republic [RS]—parties, movements, and individuals—into a joint strong front. That front's task should be a renewal of the overall economic and cultural life, the achievement of respect and equality for all the people living in the RS, and resistance to violence, hatred, and any form of national and religious intolerance. In order to realize these civilized and humane goals, without which there is no progress

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and integration into progressive European and world processes, everything in the RS that is progressive and democratic should stay together. All parties and individuals that are now sincerely oriented toward full implementation of the peace agreement should stay together. Progressive people should make impossible all divisions, suspicion, envy, and careerism if they want [word indistinct] be realized to the benefit of the people and all citizens.

I wish you much success in the work and political activities in the forthcoming free and democratic elections in the RS and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said the message that President Slobodan Milosevic sent to the participants of the First Congress of the SPRS in conclusion.

B-H: SPRS Congress Ends, Elects New Party President

AU0206125996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 1 Jun 96

[Report by Dusan Vojinovic from Banja Luka]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The First Congress of the Socialist Party of the Serb Repubic [SPRS] was opened by former party President Dragutin Ilic, who read a message from Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. [passage omitted]

In the afternoon the First SPRS Congress adopted the statute and basic points of the party program, as well as the document entitled "The Serb Republic: Through Renewal and Development to Normal Life." At the very end of the meeting, the 345 delegates elected the new president of the SPRS. He is 59-year-old Zivko Radisic, a political scientist. They also elected 91 members of the Main Committee and the Statutory and Supervision Commissions of the party.

The delegates adopted the Congress's message, which completely accepted the message that President Milosevic sent to the Congress. Among other things, the message says the following:

The SPRS Congress strongly supports peace as the greatest benefit to our people. Only through strict and consistent support for the peace agreement, cooperation with the world, and the holding of democratic and free elections will we strengthen the Serb Republic and confirm what the entire world has recognized: that we as a people deserve a better position than the one we were in until yesterday. Let us accept the hand of help and friendship that the world offers to us. We call on all people who oppose hatred, war [words indistinct], and who support tolerance, peace, and development, to get together for a united [word indistinct] future and happiness of our children, for the Serb Republic, and for our survival on this territory. By uniting all individual wishes into one, we may succeed. With its numerous members and followers, the SPRS calls on you to join us to realize what every honest man wants.

B-H: Plavsic Discusses Karadzic's Decision To Withdraw

AU0306141196 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 96 pp 18-19

[Interview with Serb Republic Vice President Biljana Plavsic by Dragan Stavljanin; place and date not given: "I Shall Be an 'Iron Lady'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Biljana Plavsic, the "hard-line" symbol in the Pale leadership, belonged to the second row of politicians for some time, but now she has suddenly become important as a partial substitute for Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic. She will take his place in charge of talks with the thing called "the international community."

[Stavljanin] Can you tell us why the decision was made for Karadzic to cede some part of his duties to you?

[Plavsic] He is entitled to do so according to the Constitution, and he could have done it before. I performed some of the tasks even before; for example, those related to some humanitarian problems. Having assessed what the Dayton agreement imposed on us—these tasks do not belong to foreign affairs, but to domestic issues—the president decided that it would be good if I took over the contacts with the international community, which are difficult.

I have the impression that the international community wants to achieve more than is foreseen by the Dayton agreement. Mr. Karadzic decided that I should perform that part of the tasks, and he will deal with domestic issues, which are numerous. The priority is the refugee issue; you should know that almost 400,000 people had left their homes and properties. Time is passing very quickly. It is necessary for everyone to have a home by next winter. A whole team will work on these tasks, which will be coordinated by Mr. Karadzic.

I shall communicate with the international community, which is a task that many people consider to be much more interesting, as it is constantly present in the mass media. It is only natural that I shall have the assistance of experts in certain fields. I hope to perform many of my tasks together with the foreign minister and with Gojko Klickovic, the new prime minister.

[Stavljanin] How do you interpret the information spread by the Serbian media, primarily TANJUG and the radio and television, that you are the acting president

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now and that Mr. Karadzic is withdrawing; in other words, that he is finally leaving and that you will fully replace him?

[Plavsic] No, he has ceded many of his tasks to me. This can be interpreted in various ways, but, according to the Constitution, President Karadzic is the president of the republic and he represents it.

[Stavljanin] At his meeting with Mr. Krajisnik yesterday and in the talks with Milosevic in Belgrade, Mr. Bildt, the high representative of the United Nations, required an answer to the question of whether Mr. Karadzic has withdrawn or whether he has retained his function. At the same time, he insisted on Karadzic's withdrawal.

[Plavsic] The expression "withdrawal" can be interpreted in various ways. It can also be interpreted in the way that he did not give up his duties and did not cede his presidential duties to someone else. The withdrawal can simply be interpreted as his withdrawal from, concretely, the mass media.... It does not mean that the tasks he will perform are not of interest. They are of huge interest for the people, but they are not as attractive for the media as his previous duties. In my opinion, these tasks are of vital interest for the people. The life of the people depends on the tasks he will work on. The Dayton agreement is clear; it is contained in the booklet entitled "The Dayton Agreement." The framework is defined. We cannot make more out of the Dayton agreement, but we have to be very careful not to give anybody more than is required by the Dayton agreement. This was the problem of Mr. Kasagic, the previous prime minister.

[Stavljanin] Carl Bildt points out that it is impossible for Karadzic to remain in power.

[Plavsic] This is Mr. Bildt's opinion.

[Stavljanin] Will Karadzic be nominated as a candidate in the forthcoming election, regardless of the fact that he has been accused of war crimes?

[Plavsic] Nobody knows who will be nominated until the Serbian Democratic Party decides on that issue. We are just completing the internal party elections. The assembly of the party will meet soon, and then it will be known who will participate in the election.

[Stavljanin] It has been mentioned that you might run for president of the Serb Republic.

[Plavsic] If my party requires that from me, I shall run for president, and on no other condition.

[Stavljanin] You have stressed on several occasions that Karadzic had ceded some powers to you in order to dedicate himself to domestic politics. Is this not preparation for his complete withdrawal?

[Plavsic] I would like to speak about facts, not about interpretations, as there are too many of them. Some newspapers say I am the acting president, others claim that this is his withdrawal. Not to mention the fantasies of some international media. It will be possible to see the real situation in several days, when all this fuss is over.

[Stavljanin] And what are the facts?

[Plavsic] The facts are that Karadzic is still the president of the Serb Republic and that he has made use of his right to cede some of his duties, temporarily, to one of the vice presidents.

[Stavljanin] Will Karadzic be extradited?

[Plavsic] Who will extradite him? I cannot imagine a single Serb who could do something like that, not only to Karadzic but to anyone who participated in our struggle.

[Stavljanin] Does this mean that the Serbs did not commit war crimes?

[Plavsic] I do not want to say that they did not, but this should be examined by our judicial institutions.

[Stavljanin] You said that you would be "an iron lady."

[Plavsic] I support implementation by agreement. Until the moment when an agreement is reached, I am very flexible. Once an agreement is reached, however, I really am, as Mr. Bildt claims, "an iron lady." In other words, there will be no giving in until the things, which have been defined, are achieved.

[Stavljanin] We have mentioned Mr. Kasagic, the former prime minister. What did you have in mind when you said that he, in a way, enabled things to be implemented that were not contained in the Dayton agreement?

[Plavsic] I should tell you very many things about his work in a relatively short period of time. Many things have happened. The deputies, and not only deputies, but the whole people simply asked the question: "Where are we going?" I mean the compliments he was paid by the international community, you know for his cooperativeness. You can be cooperative, but you must stick to the policy decided on by the National Assembly. Apart from that, the former prime minister is a deputy too, and he knows very well what it means if the implementation differs from the decisions that have been taken, which are very important for the people.

[Stavljanin] He has been reproached for his intention to incorporate the Serb Republic into a unitary Bosnia.

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[Plavsic] This is what I meant when I said that there was a wish to achieve more than what the Dayton agreement requires. I think that I have said somewhere, for JAVNOST I think, that the Dayton agreement has to be respected, but not an inch more than that.

[Stavljanin] Did Mr. Kasagic really work on the incorporation of the Serb Republic into a unitary Bosnia?

[Plavsic] In some of his statements he even used the expression "reintegration." You know, the expression "reintegration" can continuously been heard in connection with eastern Slavonia. They are not identical—eastern Slavonia and the Serb Republic. It is not mentioned in the preamble to the Dayton agreement that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a union. It is only mentioned that it consists of two entities—the Muslim-Croatian federation and the Serb Republic. Why are we annulling that entity? No one is entitled to do that.

[Stavljanin] In the interview for JAVNOST, you mentioned that Kasagic enabled international mediators, primarily Bildt, to become involved in both internal and personnel issues, in the reconstruction of the government....

[Plavsic] There were probably some agreements. Mr. Bildt's reaction regarding the dismissal of Mr. Kasagic was very spontaneous at the beginning: He said that he would protect him, and that no one is entitled to dismiss Kasagic. But everything was done in line with the Constitution. Mr. Bildt was shown the Constitution from December 1994 and, after that, he really did not make any more remarks.

[Stavljanin] In Pale, it is feared that a coup could be launched by Kasagic in cooperation with IFOR [Implementation Force].

[Plavsic] I think we can say that this is over.

[Stavljanin] Was there such a danger?

[Plavsic] Yes, it seems there was.

[Stavljanin] There are rumors that, apart from Bildt, Mr. Milosevic also requested the withdrawal of Mr. Karadzic last weekend?

[Plavsic] I do not know. I am not familiar with that.

[Stavljanin] There were, in other words, no contacts between the members of the Pale leadership and Mr. Milosevic?

[Plavsic] No.

[Stavljanin] What form will your contacts with the bodies of the Federation in Sarajevo take?

[Plavsic] It seems to me now that the contacts with the Federation and its institutions in Sarajevo will go through the government. I do not think that I shall have to undertake these contacts. It seems to me that this task will probably be done by Mr. Klickovic.

[Stavljanin] What about the cooperation with official Belgrade?

[Plavsic] I shall maintain those contacts to the extent they were maintained by Mr. Karadzic.

[Stavljanin] Did he have contacts with Belgrade recently?

[Plavsic] I think that it is well known that certain agreements must have been made. The situation required agreements between the Serb Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[Stavljanin] What I mean is whether Mr. Karadzic personally had contacts with Milosevic?

[Plavsic] I do not know whether he had any recently, but there are contacts very often—with either Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, the chairman of the Assembly—which is only natural. Why should there be no contacts? There are contacts. It would be senseless if there were no contacts. There are contacts with the Muslim-Croatian federation too, so why should there be no contacts with Yugoslavia?

[Stavljanin] Will you come to Belgrade now, after you have been appointed to a new position?

[Plavsic] Yes, probably. It can happen that I will come privately in this function. [sentence as published]

[Stavljanin] Will you meet with Mr. Milosevic, who expressed a very poor opinion of you three years ago?

[Plavsic] I am not entitled to think about his comments about me. I am not entitled to do so since the interests of the people is the most important issue, and I shall keep this in mind.

[Stavljanin] Your opponents claim Mr. Karadzic decided to appoint you, because you—just like Mr. Karadzic—are very loyal to the firm national orientation.

[Plavsic] I have not changed my opinion since the beginning of the war. I have not changed, although the daily politics changed, because I have a firm attitude about the Serbian nation, and I cannot change it. It is only natural that circumstances change and that it is perhaps necessary to change certain things, but you always have to think of the final intention, that you have to reach a certain goal.

[Stavljanin] How would you comment on the claims that, in the future, Mr. Karadzic will be able to

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influence—that is, to control—you and all other things, just as has been the case so far?

[Plavsic] It is not necessary to control me. That is ridiculous. Mr. Karadzic has had many opportunities to get to know me, and he knows that almost no one can influence me in a way that will lead me to change my general orientation. I have been very consistent since the very beginning, and he has had the opportunity to see that I am not inclined to changes, or, better to say, that I am not ready to change anything regarding the national goal. I do not want to say that methods cannot be changed, since circumstances may require this.

[Stavljanin] How will you feel as the only woman among so many men? You once said: "I mediated in all rifts, I was like glue between Karadzic and Mladic, between the men in the Serb Republic, these horribly vain infantile boys...."

[Plavsic] I have never mentioned "infantile boys." I have really not said anything like that. Regarding my function as "glue," I really had such a function.

[Stavljanin] You said: "I am begging them not to quarrel and split, and every one of them wants power so much that he spits like a tomcat."

[Plavsic] I certainly did not say that. I don't know, this is nasty.

[Stavljanin] In the interview for JAVNOST, you said that there were certain assessments that, with Karadzic's withdrawal—that is, Karadzic's decision to withdraw—the Serb Republic would enter a certain autocracy toward the international community. You said that it is not necessary to go there, that it is possible to live without loans, and that the Serb Republic could also develop without certain investments.

[Plavsic] I support the idea of taking what can be obtained without blackmail. I oppose taking money if blackmail is practiced.

B-H: Retired General Comments on Karadzic, Mladic

LD3105200496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 31 May (SRNA)—A well-known military and political commentator, retired General Radovan Radinovic, said today that the balance of power in the territory of the former Yugoslavia will remain in favor of the Serb side even after the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

In an interview for SRNA, Radinovic specified that the balance of power between "the Muslim-Croat Federation in alliance with Croatia and the Serb Republic, in natural alliance with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, will be around 40 percent to the advantage of the Serb side." [passage omitted]

Well-known analyst Radovan Radinovic stressed in the interview with SRNA today that "the whole process involving The Hague tribunal had a pronounced political background."

"Declaring that the Serbs are beasts is an attempt to exonerate the Germans who committed terrible crimes during World War II," Radinovic warned.

He also pointed to the fact that it was not only the Serbs who had waged war, but also Muslims and Croats, and that Croatia was constantly directly involved in the Bosnian conflict during which many crimes against Serbs were committed.

"Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic, is the embodiment of the Serb people, and General Ratko Mladic of the army led an honorable Serb battle," Radinovic stressed. He added that if they were brought to The Hague tribunal, all the guilt will automatically pass onto the Serbs and their struggle will be degraded.

He believes that the list of indicted Serbs is not final, and expects it to be extended to include Serbs east of the Drina River.

"There can be cooperation with The Hague tribunal only inasmuch as our judiciary can question those accused of war crimes, because our judiciary, too, has the necessary credibility," Radinovic said. He warned that extradition of our citizens to the Hague tribunal on the basis of groundless accusations will seriously undermine the political credibility of the authorities that acted in that way.

Speaking about the possibility of IFOR [Implementation Force] attempting to arrest President Karadzic and General Mladic, the military analyst stressed that he was not sure whether the international forces were capable of doing that.

"Mladic commands absolute authority in the Serb Republic and has incredible charisma, not only among soldiers but among people, too. I think that his arrest will have terrible consequences for both the Serb Republic and peace in Bosnia," Radinovic warned and added:

"I am sure that General Mladic has unwavering support from the Serb people and IFOR will have to count on sustaining considerable losses if they arrest him."

Radinovic said he believed that late Serb General Djordje Djukic had been murdered in The Hague. "When I say murdered, I do not mean it literally. He was ill, but he will have certainly lived longer had he

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not been taken to The Hague. We should have taken greater advantage of this fact and used it to demonstrate how much evil has been done to the Serbs," Radinovic said in conclusion.

B-H: Silajdzic Says Muslim-Croat Federation 'Falling Apart'

LD0306164896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 3 Jun (TANJUG)—Dr. Haris Silajdzic [former Bosnian prime minister], chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [Stranka za Bosnu I Herzegovinu], said today that the Muslim-Croat federation "has been falling apart from the very moment the agreement on its setting up was signed in Washington" and that it is ending now owing to three parallel authorities: "the government of the federation, the government of the Republic [of Bosnia-Herzegovina], and the government of Herzeg-Bosnia."

Silajdzic told the "national DAN monthly magazine" that the "disintegration of the federation is gaining momentum" and added that those who had yearned for this outcome were achieving success.

Silajdzic, whose party is regarded as one of the main rivals of Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action in the elections in September, accused the Croat side of "striving to divide Bosnia from the very beginning" by demanding "constant concessions and promising that they would disband Herzeg-Bosnia in exchange."

"They claimed that only a speedy dissolution of the Republic could lead to the implementation of the federation. What do we have today? An impotent government Bosnia-Herzegovina whose powers have been drastically reduced, a federal government which is not able to perform its duties and, naturally, Herzeg-Bosnia still exists," Silajdzic said. [passage omitted]

B-H: Court Requests 'Verified' Translation of Constitution

AU0306193296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina has informed the Republican Assembly that is necessary to adopt an agreed and verified text of the translation of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the languages in official use in our country. The translation should be published in the official media.

The Constitutional Court has sent a letter of similar content to Carl Bildt, high representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the peace agreement. The Constitutional Court has sent this request because of the situation that has arisen from the different interpretation of some provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Dayton Agreement, a statement issued by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina says.

B-H: Article Views Series of Strikes, Need for Economic Aid

AU0306162496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 96 p 6

[Report by Gorden Knezovic: "Eight Hours in a Mine for Two German Marks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar—The post-Dayton period in Bosnia-Herzegovina is characterized by the disunity of the positions of the international community on the implementation of the agreements that were agreed upon under its patronage. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a peaceful period has begun, in which it is most important to secure the beginning of the renewal, as well as the solving of the vital problems of the inhabitants. However, the inefficiency of the office of the high commissioner for the implementation of the civil part of the peace agreement, Carl Bildt, and the absence of the necessary international economic aid to the destroyed Bosnia-Herzegovina economy are not even slightly encouraging.

Last week, with the absence of the international economic aid in the vitalization of the economy, there was a wave of strikes in the parts of the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy that, during the war, were the foundation of the war economy, primarily in the Bosnia-Herzegovina mines. The justified demands of the miners for an increase in wages are related to the 60-percent retroactive increase in wages for the month of April and the same for each successive month until the miners' wages reach the average wage in the noneconomy. The miners cannot survive on the 2 German marks that they receive for an eight-hour shift. Apart from the miners, the workers at the Ilijas iron works are asking the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government to make a clear proclamation regarding the future of the works, which once used to be a economic giant. The iron works and the foundry employed 3,400 workers before the war, and they have now been demobilized and are without any income.

Necessary International Aid

Well, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government cannot offer anything to the dissatisfied workers without international aid, and what is arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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as economic restoration aid is not even enough to establish at least a social minimum that would prevent social unrest.

The demands of the miners are, for now, not motivated by any political reasons, but the question is how the social dissatisfaction will effect the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government was also interested in, at least temporarily, calming down the miners' dissatisfaction due to the fact that the mines are one of the pillars of the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy. The entire Bosnia-Herzegovina energy system is based on coal production for thermoelectric power plants, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government's decision to have the thermoelectric power plants served the government in providing the strategic independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatia. From the start, the entire Bosniak war system functioned without financial movement. No one paid for electricity. The Elektroprivreda [Electric Power Company] Bosnia-Herzegovina did not pay the mine works for the coal, no one received wages, and everyone lived off humanitarian aid. This magic cycle that functioned during the war simply could not be transferred to peacetime. These times of peace are presenting the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government with a defined financial policy, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina dinar cannot function without being covered by foreign currency.

The Postponement of a Solution to the Problem

Until now, it was not possible to do something in this respect, and the last solution of using the $4 million of Iranian aid for the purchases of goods only set the problem aside. According to the decision of the staff of the governor of the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina, banks can use the money they received only for the payment of obligations to foreign partners, and then only if they are paying for the import of raw material, nonfinished products [repromaterijal], and goods meant for wide consumption. According to the same decision of the staff, the banks that are making the payments for imported goods are obliged to set up the sale of the aforementioned goods to the final consumers exclusively for Bosnia-Herzegovina dinars.

The assistance plan of the U.S. Government, which has, so far been the only government to show a serious will to invest in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is primarily related to aid for the balance of payments and the liquidity of the economy and financial support for the commercial industrial sector. In 1996, the U.S. Government will set aside $60 million for this purpose, which will be directed toward the restoration of the companies with market prospects. In three years, the program is to provide $278 million of reserves for the renewed setting up of smaller deals, which will be supervised by U.S. investors, and the program is to provide jobs for 40,000 people. All this, however, will not be enough, and it is obviously in the interests of the international community to keep the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a social minimum so that the social conditions will not be an obstacle to the implementation of the peace agreement.

B-H: Bijeljina Serbs Reportedly Mobilized for Kosovo

AU0306151996 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Jun 96 p 6

[Report by M. Pa.: "For Slobo's Salvation in Kosovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Bijeljina and other places in Karadzic's empire, people are again living in fear of mobilization. Young people are either in hiding or are fleeing out of the reach of the Serb police.

What is happening?

The mobilized Serbs are being dispatched to Kosovo, where the tension is growing due to disturbances caused by the Serb police's oppression of the ethnic Albanians.

Isn't it Kosovo's turn?

Time will tell, but in any case, the Serbian leader [Milosevic] is using proven methods to protect his own position as the state leader, assisted by the ever-larger police force, which is the best paid profession in Serbia at the moment. Since, in Belgrade and also in other places social discontent is ever greater and protests by trade unions are more and more frequent, the Serbian police are becoming ever busier. Assistance is demanded from the Bosnian Serbs, who, leaving for Kosovo—and perhaps even for other crisis regions in Serbia—are repaying their debt to the Serbians for their assistance in the course of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Blood is not water, and Serbianhood must be defended "wherever it is necessary to do so."

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Croatia: HDZ Official Views Role as Tudjman Adviser

AU0306130796 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 25 May 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Ivic Pasalic, vice president of the HDZ and adviser to the Croatian president for internal policy, by Aleksa Crnjakovic; place and date not given: "Croatia Must Not Be Blackmailed!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Crnjakovic] Right now talks between the Union of Opposition Parties and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], concerning the resolution of the Zagreb crisis, are taking place. Is there any chance for a compromise?

[Pasalic] Until now we have had three negotiating meetings, of which the last was more concrete and, one could say, it brought certain advances. The talks will be continued with the aim of finding a compromise that would be acceptable for both sides. Problems will arise concerning principal attitudes toward the organization of the city authorities. We believe that the HDZ has the right, by virtue of the fact that it has a relative majority in the City Assembly, to propose the mayor, and that all other posts in the city authorities should be taken proportionately to the success of individual parties in the elections. The united opposition believes that they have the majority, which gives them the right to the mayor's post.

[Crnjakovic] The principle that you advocate was not used for the nomination of the government. Why?

[Pasalic] The objection is not logical because in the assembly our party has an absolute majority, so that it has a mandate to form the government independently, and it is a matter of its political will whether in that government there will be any ministers from other parties. That is one of the basic rules of parliamentary democracy. In Zagreb none of the parties that went to elections independently has an absolute majority, so that it is logical that they form coalitions.

Political Precedent

[Crnjakovic] It is logical, but practice sometimes goes beyond logic. Namely, nobody wants to enter a coalition with you. In that case are you not forced to accept that fact?

[Pasalic] What happened in Zagreb was nearly a political precedent. One strange union was created, politically completely unharmonious, both concerning their individual programs, interests, objectives, and concerning people. They do not create a homogeneous whole that could guarantee the good functioning of the representative body of Zagreb and of the Zagreb city authorities. The union was created based on the political idea of confrontation with the HDZ at any price, and that atypical model of political behavior cannot be of lasting character, it cannot survive for long. It is logical that parties that are similar in their programs and political objectives can form a stable coalition, so that they can guarantee long-term political stability. I believe that it will come to such processes in Croatia, that preconditions will be created for the HDZ to enter various forms of cooperation and possible preelection or postelection coalitions that stabilize the political scene of Croatia.

[Crnjakovic] Why do you want the mayor's post at any price? Is it politically all that significant?

[Pasalic] It has to do with the political principle of responsibility for the effective functioning of local rule and self-rule.

[Crnjakovic] To stubbornly hold on to a principle, even at the price of a long period of political instability?

[Pasalic] On the contrary! If you give up a political principle, you will question your own political trustworthiness. It is not mere stubbornness, but principles on which parliamentary democracy lies. But, I repeat, we are for compromise and that is why we have offered that the mayor be a nonparty person. Unfortunately, that democratic proposal was not accepted. The real question is why.

[Crnjakovic] What comes now?

[Pasalic] The assembly does its work. [passage omitted]

[Crnjakovic] Once more Croatia has remained in the European waiting room. Do you agree with some claims that the present regime has given arguments to the Council of Europe to hand in the planned rejection? What I have in mind are the moves directed toward the means of information, in the first place [sentence as published]. Bad timing?

[Pasalic] The fact that the council of ministers has prolonged the decision on admitting Croatia to the Council of Europe has nothing to do with the alleged undemocratic moves of the Croatian regime. It is clear to everybody who knows something about politics that these are additional forms of manipulation, regarding the fact that it is still not known how things will develop in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what the final political destiny of this part of Europe will be. Croatia is a stable political factor, and it significantly determines the events in this region, so that certain political circles in Europe try to keep Croatia in check, blackmailing it with admission in international organizations. They forget that even under much harder circumstances it was not possible

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to blackmail Croatia. Even at the times when the risk was much greater Croatia did not conduct its policy on the basis of blackmail. The Croatian public must know that the alleged obstruction of the freedom of the media is only a good alibi for such blackmail.

The Case of FERAL TRIBUNE

[Crnjakovic] Why do you provide them with those alibis? Why were taxes on NOVI LIST not imposed earlier? What is the reason for the meaningless closing down of PANORAMSKA VRATA?

[Pasalic] When it comes to reasons, those European circles that give themselves the right to judge the degree of democracy in Croatia will always find reasons. Must the state regime stop functioning in order to court those circles? Does it have to ask them when it will start collecting taxes that are regulated by law? Is there a state that does not sanction the payment of taxes? FERAL TRIBUNE has written so many insinuations and untruths that have irritated the public that this would have been sanctioned in every state. They are trying to impose a complex upon us that sanctioning means the obstruction of the freedom of the media. Unfortunately, in Croatia the law does not clearly define the limits of freedom and the rules of the journalistic profession, the rights and responsibilities of journalists. That is why every move that the regime makes is experienced as an attack on the freedom of the media. If in any country a direct connection were made between the head of state and fascists, as was the case with FERAL TRIBUNE, where Tudjman was linked with Pavelic [Ustasha leader from World War II], and where insinuations were published about Jasenovac [concentration camp from World War II], that would have been legally sanctioned, and the journalists would quite certainly have reacted. I believe that some media intentionally force the state to resort to repression, so that others can use that as a reason for fighting against Croatia.

[Crnjakovic] You are the vice president of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. Has not such a systematic, frontal campaign considerably harmed the reputation and the popularity of the ruling party? If so, how will that be reflected in the coming election results?

[Pasalic] It is quite certain that such a campaign that has been relatively well organized and in which various groups from certain political parties, media and nongovernmental organizations take part, has an effect. However, the Croatian public is clever enough, the electorate is mature enough, and it has already gone through worse times, so that eventually, before the voting box, they will know how to weigh all the arguments and know how to judge who can be trusted and to whom they can give their votes. It is clear that our party has weak points as well, and it is a fact that the legal state has still not started functioning entirely. People are rightfully sensitive to the fact that criminal acts are not sanctioned in a faster and more effective way in every respect. [passage omitted]

The Function of the Foundation

[Crnjakovic] Regardless of what you do, you are criticized! Recently you have been criticized for establishing the Foundation of the Croatian State Pledge [Zaklada hrvatsko-drzavnog zavjeta]. Some claim that that is a new Kumrovec [Tito's birthplace] school for the education of the future HDZ cadre. Why has the foundation been established, who finances it?

[Pasalic] Yes, regardless of what we do, we are evaluated badly! When we have a convention, then that is called the "Plenary of the Central Committee [of the Communist Party]," and when other partiesdo that, then that is a European party convention. When Soros establishes foundations, then that is heip to democratic processesin undemocratic countries. If there is a wish to write something bad about us, then they will do so, regardless of what we do! When I conceived the foundation, I was aware of the fact that there will be objections that we are creating a school for future party ideologists, but I knew that those theses will not be supported by any arguments. The idea was born three years ago in the circle of the HDZ Youth, particularly among those of them who had been abroad for a long time and who knew exactly how parties were formed into modern and successful ones. Every modern European party has such a foundation! That is simply a form of modern political communication within the country in which the foundation acts, but also in international relationships. Last year in October the presidency of the HDZ passed a decision to establish the foundation, the first of that sort here.

[Crnjakovic] What will be done within the foundation?

[Pasalic] In the first place, cultural political dialogues will take place within the foundation. People who know something and who want to say something about any issues that concern the organization of a modern state will gather in it. We will organize panel discussions, seminars, and so on, we will try to influence the state authorities and the public. Of course that will be a place where people of similar standpoints will gather, and it will promote and cherish the statehood policy of President Tudjman, which brought about the creation of the Croatian state. So it will not be of an exclusively party nature. If Soros has legitimacy for his activities, is it not logical for this foundation to have it too? Why should we not send journalists to be educated in

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the United States, why should we not award grants to talented students and to the children of killed soldiers, why should we not pay for international seminars for academicians?

[Crnjakovic] Who will finance all that?

[Pasalic] Individuals and companies will give donations. In that way the donors will get certain tax privileges.

[Crnjakovic] Who is the first or the biggest donor?

[Pasalic] The first donor that enabled the furnishing of offices in the Gunduliceva Street was the Croatia Bank, and we are expecting to get a donation from the Dubrovacka Bank, Medika, and some others.

Electoral Law

[Crnjakovic] Those will not be donations from public, state companies?

[Pasalic] We will try to get most of the money from private companies, but there is no reason for public companies not to take part in it, although I know that there will be objections that we are using our political influence. We will cooperate with similar foundations in the world. Our minister of foreign affairs has already been a guest of such foundations several times.

[Crnjakovic] You have been the president's adviser for internal policy for a long time now. What is the true influence of the president's advisers? Do they interfere with the flow of information?

[Pasalic] There is a considerable lack of understanding of our work. We cover the events in our respective sectors, we present our views, we propose solutions, and even make decisions, usually in cooperation with individual ministers.

[Crnjakovic] Can you propose to the president an attitude that would be contrary to his own concerning, for example, the Zagreb crisis?

[Pasalic] Every adviser has an opportunity to speak his mind. Nobody, including the president, will blame me for having a different opinion, and in most cases the president will listen to my attitude and to the opinions of many others. The final decision is made by the president. It is not the job of advisers to "deliberate" and "advise," but to do concrete things. Sokol will make the political decision related to the electoral law operational, Vitez will take part in solving the problems that arose in culture, and so on.

[Crnjakovic] When the president asks you which electoral law would be most effective for the HDZ, what will you tell him?

[Pasalic] In creating the electoral law there is space for advisory ideas. Some of them will be used in creating laws.

[Crnjakovic] What concretely?

[Pasalic] You will find that out in June.

Croatia: Concealment of Correspondence With CE Denied

LD3105165396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The weekly NACIONAL carries on its cover, second and third page today, a big headline saying that Foreign Minister Mate Granic has concealed a letter announcing that Croatia will not be admitted into the Council of Europe.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes it necessary to say the following regarding this issue:

There is no ground for the accusation raised in the article by Majetic [not further identified]. Minister Granic exchanged many letters during the negotiations on Croatia's membership in the Council of Europe, not only with the Council's rapporteur, (Rene Van der Linden), but many other politicians.

The fact that this correspondence was not made public does not mean that Minister Granic concealed anything from the public, but only that he was performing his ministerial duties in line with diplomatic rules.

Namely, even in everyday life and in diplomacy in particular, the publication of letters is a matter for their author and not the addressee, unless both parties agree on it.

So if this letter was not published by (Van der Linden) himself, as it was not, Minister Granic could not do it.

Nevertheless, the Croatian public was regularly and comprehensively informed on all the developments regarding the procedure of Croatia's admission as a full member into the Council of Europe.

The same text and several others in the same issue of NACIONAL are full of other invented facts and allegations regarding the work of Minister Granic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the ministry will answer these in the newspaper, the office of the Foreign Ministry's spokesman has said.

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Croatia: Slavonia Demilitarization To Be Complete by 15 Jun

AU0406101396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0923 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vinkovci, 4 Jun (BETA)—General Slavko Baric, Croatian president's envoy for military issues in the office of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem [UNTAES], has announced that in two days the Serbs in that region are to hand over all their military facilities to UNTAES.

"I expect that the demilitarization will be completed around 15 June, which means that all the paramilitary Serb units will be demobilized and the military facilities handed over," Baric said, according to Croatian Radio.

The Serb side has still not submitted to UNTAES the information on minefields, and here we see resistance to the process of the region's demilitarization within 30 days, Baric said.

He claims that the Serbs will try to conceal several warehouses of small arms in Baranja, Vukovar, and Fruska Gora, and that some 3,000 soldiers have remained in Serb units, who are now applying to join the mixed police under UNTAES command.

Croatia: Serbs Set Conditions for Croatian Citizenship

LD0406100796 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 2330 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In relation to the Basic Agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, reached in Erdut, the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions, 1025 and 1037. The resolutions elaborate the details concerning the reintegration of this region into the legal and constituional system of Croatia at the expense of the Serb people.

In line with the demands of the population and five municipality assemblies of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, the executive council of this region has reviewed the blueprint which is to be adopted by the regional assembly and outlines the conditions to be met in order for the Serbs of that area to remain there and thus survive.

[Vojislav Stanimirovic, local official] Because of the war events, etc. [as heard] we will insist on the region being a demilitarized zone, on the moratorium on army service remaining in force for another 15-20 years [words indistinct].

We will demand that Croatia adopts a complete and total law on amnesty and abolition. We will demand to have our educational system. We will demand that our region remains within the present borders—the Erdut Agreement allows this. We will not accept the territorial division of our region into two counties, something the Croats want. They have divided this in two counties—Osijek-Baranja to which Baranja would belong and Vukovar-Srem to which the rest ofour region would go. In practice we would be swallowed up by these two counties, and we would be a minority population.

We will demand that the Council of Europe, and not Croatia, organize the elections. Also that we have our insignia and that we are allowed to use our script. We will demand to have our judicial system and administration; the distribution of the legislative power between the Croat parliament and our regional parliament. It means that up to a certain level, up to the regional level, we should have our own judicial authorities.

We will also ask to receive local citizenship. We will accept Croat citizenship on the condition that we also receive local citizenship.

[Correspondent] And what if you do not receive this?

[Stanimirovic] [words indistinct] If we go under complete Croat sovereignty and their authority I believe there will be a massive fourth exodus of the population from here.

I think our departure from here is neither in the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem] mandate nor is it in the interest of the international community. It is not in the interest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it is not in our interest. Our departure from here would be only in the interest of Croatia.

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FYROM: Gligorov Assesses Visit to Finland, Sweden

AU3105165996 Skopje MIC in English 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The three-day visit to Finland and Sweden has confirmed that there is great interest and opportunities for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] developing cooperation with Sweden and Finland. We count these countries among the most friendly countries, since, during our independence and international establishment, they stood by Macedonia, helping it get integrated into the international institutions and organizations," President Gligorov said at yesterday's press conference in Stockholm, at which he assessed the participation of soldiers from these two countries in the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment] peacekeeping mission in Macedonia as very successful.

President Gligorov had an audience yesterday with the Swedish King Karl Gustav XVI. The discussion centered around opinions on the current situation in the Balkans and Macedonia, the implementation of the Dayton peace accord and the activities of the UN peacekeepers on this plan. The Macedonian president particularly emphasized the role of the Swedish soldiers in the Nordic battalion in UNPREDEP, thanking Sweden for its support in the process of Macedonia's integration into the European organizations.

The Swedish sovereign used this opportunity to recall his visit to Ohrid in 1983, and to recognize Macedonia for its constructive foreign policy in the region and wider.

The Macedonian President also met yesterday with the Swedish Prime Minister Joran Person, whereby they underlined the traditional friendly ties between the two countries existing back from the Second World War, which are continuing with the presence of the numerous Macedonian citizens on temporary or permanent stay in Sweden.

President Gligorov also met with the speaker of the Swedish Parliament Brigita Dao, and with representatives of the Macedonian community in Sweden on Wednesday.

FYROM: Daily Criticizes Tearful Gligorov Speech

AU0406084496 Skopje DELO in Macedonian 31 May 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Gligorov's Tears"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Ohrid last weekend, as part of the celebration of "St. Cyril and Methodius" Day, there was the traditional meeting of teachers. Beside the minister, Kiro Gligorov also participated and spoke. Instead of the expected speech pegged to the occasion, Gligorov delivered a monologue, that is, a monodrama, that lasted two whole hours. Tearfully and with brief interruptions because of the weeping, Kiro Gligorov opened his soul to the teachers. Thus, according to what the participants claim, he mourned the fall of Yugoslavia with tears in his eyes, and when he spoke about "our" small Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] he was nearly sobbing when he declared that he lives in constant fear for the survival of "our" small country, which is so small that it could be destroyed by an air crash, by a single air disaster. (Amazingly, or fortunately, Macedonia is still alive and well even after three air crashes). With a calmer voice but with bitterness in his soul, Gligorov explained to the teachers that all our problems with Greece come from the fact that the Greek business people like us, but the Greek politicians do not! After his chat about "foreign" friends and enemies, Gligorov wept again when he spoke of the assassination attempt. Nevertheless, the most interesting part was when, in his tear-filled statement, he told the participants that the assassination attempt was the act of some people from Macedonia, of domestic "traitors," because Macedonia has only a few foreign enemies. The real climax came when Gligorov was again tearfully lamenting the low wages of the teachers, after which, we discovered, he received support in his weeping from a number of teachers themselves. This Gligorov monodrama, which is a repetition of similar speeches of his in Croatia and in the cafe of Skopje Drama Theater, openly raises the question whether and to what extent the institution of the state presidency is functioning in Macedonia.

FYROM: Commission Rules Against Referendum on Elections

AU0306200196 Skopje MIC in English 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Legislative-legal commission of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly concluded at its session on Friday that there is no constitutional basis for making a decision to issue a notice on referendum for early parliamentary elections. This decision was made with eight votes "in favor," while the only ones "against" were the representatives of the Liberals, who had a completely opposite opinion. The first to take part in the debate were the representatives of the initiators Georgi Naumov (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity [VMRO-DPMNE]) and Slavko Petrov from the Democratic Party [DP]. In his explanation of the initiative, Naumov stressed that it has both a constitutional and legal (Law on Referendum) basis, starting from article 2 of the Constitution, that power is derived from the sovereignty of the citizens, that all question

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can be raised at a Referendum (with the exception of war), and finally, article 8 of the Constitution, according to which everything that is not forbidden is allowed.

For Slavko Petrov, article 68 of the Constitution is most essential, as it lists the spheres of competence of the Assembly, including "other activities determined by the Constitution," where he locates the question of referendum for early elections. In this context, he also raised the question—if Parliament is recognized the right to disband before time, does it have the right to deny the citizens the right to revoke the mandate of the Representatives?

The members of the Commission, with the exception of the representative of the Liberal Party, tabled an opposite opinion. Speaking of the normative aspects of the question of Referendum, Tuse Gosev emphasized that the Constitution does not foresee early elections, but is clear and speaks of a four-year mandate of the Representatives, whereby the citizens also convey their sovereignty to them. Article 63 allows for the possibility of self-dismissal of the Representatives, while article 68 determines the spheres of competence of the Assembly, which do not foresee the possibility of issuing a notice on Referendum for early elections. According to this, this civil initiative, Gosev said, has no constitutional foundation. To Mersel Bilali, the initiative represents a legal, political, and moral issue, while according to Ivan Bojkov, it has a political-marketing character and its ratification would mean constant games—called early elections. Abduladi Vejeseli views the initiative more as political than pure civil, while Hisen Ramadani emphasized that the Constitution does not allow for the will of the citizens expressed at the elections to "change" during the mandate.

Of all the members of the Commission, only Panco Minov (Liberal Party) expressed an opposite opinion—that the initiative has a constitutional foundation.

Otherwise, the Coordinative committee of the initiators, according to yesterday's announcement, elected Ljupco Georgievski [VMRO-DPMNE president] and Petar Gosev [DP president] as its representatives, who will explain the proposal for issuing a notice on referendum for early elections at the parliamentary session.

FYROM: Albanians Seen Seeking Privileged Position

AU0306124396 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 31 May 96 pp 11-12

[Commentary by Mirce Tomovski: "Monologue as Dialogue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The end of this century, just as the beginning, has demonstrated that southeastern Europe and the Balkans in particular are fatefully associated with national phenomena. The changes in social and political relations and the efforts to achieve democratic pluralism have heightened the need for a democratic model that strikes a balance between the rights and freedoms of the minorities and the integrity and sovereignty of the state to which they belong. In this context the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is "sentenced" to such a democracy because of the colorful map of its various national individualities. The "sentence" also comes from the "abuse" of this wealth of ethnic particularities for the internal progress of the state and from the importance of the minorities for peace, stability, and security in the Balkan region. The crowded events in this area of Macedonian policy are focused on new challenges in internal democratic processes. Perhaps they are old constants that from time to time, depending on political circumstances, are developed into new threats of familiar Balkan origin. So, one is offered as dialogue what is in fact a monologue associated with personal arguments. In any case, the model of multiethnic democracy in Macedonia requires not only respect for the civilized treatment of specific national, religious, and language characteristics, but also higher standards of political and democratic culture.

Kiro Gligorov, the head of the Macedonian state, signed in Helsinki a solemn declaration for access to OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents. By doing this, the whole political range of rights and duties in relation to the minorities, which are contained in various OSCE documents, will become a part of the world of the ethnic minorities in Macedonia and of its international political and diplomatic practice. At nearly the same time, Elisabeth Rehn, UN special raporteur on human rights, declared that she accepted Gligorov's proposal for a comparative analysis of the position of the minorities in the Balkans.

Mrs Rehn, who is a Finn of Swedish origin, recommended that the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia study at the universities in Tirana or Pristina. This probably accords with her own experience—in Finland, Swedish people study in Finnish, while to study in Swedish one must go to Sweden. With this small story, Elizabeth Rehn "corrected" the statement she made in Skopje some time ago on the ethnic minorities' right to their own language at universities (at that time the Finnish example was cited as an illustration that differed from the one that is presented now).

The developments regarding the position of the ethnic minorities in Macedonia have recently gained momentum. The Vlachs are asking for more recognition of their own position in different spheres of social life. The Romanies have announced their engagement for a Roma desk at the university. The political parties that articulate the interests of the ethnic Albanians have intensified

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the expression of the known dissatisfaction with the "unequal position of the Albanians in Macedonia," and they have particularly intensified the monolith surrounding the so-called Tetovo university. When Gligorov made statements in a number of interviews for foreign media regarding the political position and education of the Albanians and the phantom "Tetovo university," the reaction was particularly strong. Never before have the attacks on President Gligorov been so sharp. However, the unprecedented intensity of the attacks represents, after all, language that has a different background from the one that was manifested. It seems that the foreign factors and the international monitors of different origin in Macedonia have come out with a prevailing feeling for the real situation, particularly regarding the ethnic Albanians. Simply, the long duration and the use of ideological terminology have become counterproductive and even paradoxical to the political engagement, whether domestic or among the lobbies abroad. When the grounds disappear, orientation is usually lost. The terminology is laden with blackmail, and the political work with manipulations, illusions, and mystification.

According to the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] leader Arber Xhafferi, Macedonia is a "big ghetto" in which the Albanians in Macedonia are no different from those in Kosovo. That is to say, the "Albanian nation" in Macedonia has not been given the necessary constitutional and legal protection. The PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and its leader, Abdurrahman Haliti, came out with the familiar and even hackneyed formula at the session of the party's Central Board in Tetovo—the Albanians in Macedonia are not equal. In order to be equal to or even more radical than the PDPA (which is impossible), the flag of the Republic of Albania and some other symbols dominated the scene at this party assembly. However, the trend of outside circumstances did not match such claims. This applies not only to Rehn's statement, but also the clear statement by Sali Berisha [Albanian president] a day before the elections in Albania. He expressed satisfaction with the position of the Albanians in Macedonia and said that they were in a different position from those in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, it is even more important that the evidence does not support the argument that is put forward on the inequality and ghettoization of the Albanians in Macedonia. The democratic establishment and the legislative and executive activities concerning the problems in this area are a constant challenge for the state.

Beside the constitutionally guaranteed right to elementary education, the developed secondary education and the Pedagogical Faculty are to help improve the standard of staff involved in the education of the students of the ethnic minorities. This faculty is beginning to engage itself in greater educational quality that will encourage more students to attend the universities in Skopje and Bitola. With the last action of the Ministry of Culture and of Minister Unkovski himself, the fund for the publication of books in the languages of the minorities has been raised, and thus [the fund] for publications in the Albanian language. The Macedonian Government has provided a large sum of money for FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT. Television and radio programs in Albanian are being extended. Together with the possibilities for commercial and radio channels, the mass media is being developed in accordance with the need for information in the languages of the ethnic minorities. In this respect, the media in Albanian are absolutely predominant. The fact that in the foreign service, police, military, and state administration there is an increasing number of staff from the ethnic minorities illustrates the tradition for coexistence and the high standards that are provided in the present democratic times.

The new territorial division of the Republic of Macedonia has almost completely responded to the legitimate requests of local communities that asked for communes. The experts and the government kept in mind the local needs of the ethnic minorities, and those of the Albanians as well, of course, and the principles enshrined in the international documents. The will of the citizens, free from discrimination and pressure, but protected as a right of an ethnic minority treated as a collective, was also respected. Even the proposal for Mala Recica, where the illegal university is located, was positively met.

The first sign of dissatisfaction with the planned territorial reorganization of the Macedonian state came from Tirana. It was an act of unprecedented interference in another state's domestic affairs. This intonation, it seems, was accepted in political unison by the ethnic Albanian parties. According to them, this project puts the Albanians in ghettos! The Gostivar Communal Assembly rejected the government's proposal. Tetovo announced an "all-national referendum on the territorial division in the commune." The fast-acting deputy Sali Ramadani announced, it seems, the general view on these questions—that the proposed administrative division in the republic should be removed from the Assembly agenda. Otherwise....

On one occasion, Abdurrahman Haliti, who is undoubtedly politically very skillful, said that there must be dialogue and a tolerant atmosphere for discussion on all questions, even those that are disputed. Two are needed for dialogue, however, as well as arguments and endless patience. When conditions are introduced in the term dialogue, there is no discussion. That is, monologue is

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offered as dialogue, with the repetition of one's own claims and views. Its refrains are—the unequal status of the Albanians in Macedonia, territorial and political autonomy, and the intonation of "Ilirida," "Tetovo University," the rigid Macedonian regime.... As a consequence of "such" behavior toward the Albanians, radical and extreme behavior is announced....

This formulation of the position, which does not take into account the real situation, opens a series of political, national, and democratic problems. It fosters the phobia that exists in Macedonia because it keeps open the possibility of conflict with the ethnic Albanians, the possibility of separation—territorial or spiritual ("Ilirida," "Tetovo University"), of ghettoization in "one's own" educational, cultural, media spheres.... To insist and impose such demands creates a delicate situation. On the one hand, they are experienced as engagement not for equality, but for a privileged position. On the other, they encroach on the sovereignty and integrity of the state whose citizens the representatives of the ethnic Albanians are.

This situation in the spiritual sense and sense of identity focuses on the ethnic Albanian parties' political responsibility for the democratic, economic, and social development of the state. Instead of a parallel legitimate struggle for national identity, and in that context the promotion of the rights and liberties to a more civilized level, there is a process that runs counter to the democratic modern times. These processes are not possible without creating an awareness that, along with rights, the ethnic minorities also have duties and responsibilities in respecting the civil establishment and rule-of-law state. Practical experience seems to be otherwise. A constant politicization among the young is being forced, particularly among children, latent prejudices are being abused, there is manipulation in the sphere of information, and national euphoria. Unfortunately, it seems impossible to understand that this kind of political engagement belongs to the past. Confidence-building, coexistence, mutual integration, de-ghettoization, the alleviation of tensions and encouragement of tranquillity in the state and among the population requires the promotion of civil manners in politics, democratic thinking and liberation from the limits of the national "confined brains." The experiences from former Yugoslav territories are undoubtedly a good lesson. Fortunately, we only witnessed rather than experienced them.

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Poland: Foreign Affairs Minister on Talks in Germany

WS0306145296 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 31 May 96 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Dariusz Rosati, Polish minister of foreign affairs, by Rudolf Hoffman; place and date not given: "More Intensive Dialogue With Germany; Support for Poland's Activeness in the East"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hoffman] After a recent meeting with you in Bonn, German Foreign Affairs Minister Klaus Kinkel said that Polish-German relations are very good. However, one can still hear complaints about some unsettled issues...

[Rosati] Minister Kinkel is right. The relations are very good. There are no political differences. Germany is playing the role of a very loyal partner. It supports our efforts to join NATO and the EU. There are certain bilateral issues that need to be resolved. Currently we are working on a culture agreement; it should be ready for signing by the end of June. There is also the issue of the German Historical Institute in Poland, which we want to put in the official registers in Warsaw. Another problem is the need to facilitate traffic at border-crossing sites. The Germans have promised to make certain technical and legal changes there to ease jams, especially during weekends. Finally, there is the issue of enabling Polonia communities [in Germany] to learn Polish in selected schools. The German side receives our conjectures with understanding; we will certainly deal with them.

[Hoffman] How do you evaluate your first working visit to Bonn?

[Rosati] In line with the 1991 agreement, foreign affairs ministers of both states should meet twice a year. My visit last week was envisioned in this calendar year; it was prepared as a review of problems, discussion of current developments, and, possibly, resolution of existing problems. Among the issues we discussed was the problem of restoring truck traffic and TIR [Transport International Routier—international transport of goods by road] licenses. Minister Kinkel promised to intercede with Brussels for us. I am satisfied with this visit. I also had a chance to talk with Bundestag Chairwoman Rita Suessmuth, Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, and K.H. Hornhuese, chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Commission. The talks confirmed that a very favorable and friendly atmosphere exists toward Poland, which must be taken advantage of.

[Hoffman] Can we infer from what you have said that Bonn's stance will speed up the decision to admit Poland to NATO and the EU?

[Rosati] I think so. Minister Kinkel believes that we need the EU more than we need NATO because Poland is not threatened by any country. However, he respects our efforts to integrate with NATO because we want to achieve both goals. Kinkel added that Germany backs us on both issues. He also said that Poland should be the first country to be included in both integration structures. I think that, as far as admission of Poland to NATO is concerned, the decision will be made early next year. I believe that the NATO Ministerial Committee will announce this December that the decision as to which countries will be admitted and when will be made at the NATO summit, which will take place in the first half of 1997.

[Hoffman] In an interview for FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, you stressed Poland's activeness in the East. Did your interlocutors bring up this issue?

[Rosati] The German side is expecting Poland to be far more active in the East. It was with great satisfaction and appreciation that Germany welcomed this activeness in our policy, especially in our policy toward Russia. I heard an opinion in the Bundestag that this was what the Germans had been waiting for. It was necessary to start this dialogue with Russia, and they are very satisfied with this.

I also heard a view that we have a very important role to play in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. Because we know the situation in the region, the Germans would like us to show more initiative in dealing with those states. This is exactly the topic I spoke about in my policy statement in the Sejm—that we should have a special policy toward these countries, which I termed as an Eastern policy. We are currently working on the principles of this policy. I am glad we have the support and understanding of the Germans on this issue.

[Hoffman] Poland has been invited to the session of the Committee of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers, which is scheduled to be held next week in Berlin. What postulates are you going to put forward at this meeting?

[Rosati] The first day of the meeting will be devoted to internal NATO issues. We will not take part in it. On that day the participants will discuss such issues as full inclusion of France into NATO—France will return to the military structures of the alliance—and the sanctioning of new functions of the organization, such as conducting peace operations outside NATO territories. This is a signal that NATO is changing its character and that this organization is assuming some responsibility for peace in the entire region.

We will join the meeting on the following day, and then we expect to hear a confirmation of the fact that the

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process of NATO expansion is continuing, regardless of various developments, and that strategic decisions we are expecting will be made in the near future. We expect that the ministerial summit meeting in Berlin will change NATO regulations so that the organization will be able to admit new members.

[Hoffman] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: NIE To Stop Running Material on UOP-U.S. Cooperation

WS0406113096 Warsaw NIE in Polish 6 Jun 96 p 1

[Letter from Chief Editor Jerzy Urban; date not given: "I Wash My Hands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The press misinterpreted the nature and course my meeting with Ministers Siemiatkowski [Interior Affairs] and Kapkowski [chief of the Office of State Protection—UOP]. I was not "summoned" by Siemiatkowski (GAZETA WYBORCZA), and Urban was neither "scolded" (RZECZPOSPOLITA) nor "instructed" (ZYCIE WARSZAWY). Urban was not "called to report" (TRYBUNA).

I wish to explain that ministers—Zbigniew Siemiatkowski being no exception—can summon and instruct (in the words the interior minister himself used in the Sejm) their personnel or their children, but not editors. I accepted the invitation to talk, and, as the statement we carry on page two [official statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] says, I was informed because that is as far as the authority and responsibility of ministers with regard to the press reach.

Minister Siemiatkowski assured me that cooperation between UOP and its U.S. counterpart is significant and beneficial for the Polish state. As a member of the Social Democracy of Poland, I trust Siemiatkowski, a minister from my own party, who has displayed courage in ridding UOP of politicking. Thus, I undertook the obligation that NIE will no longer publish or comment on any information on cooperation with the United States. I did warn, however, that this temperance will not apply to cases of misuse of technical means serving Polish-U.S. cooperation to carry out illegal activities within Poland, in particular to spur intrigue among Polish authorities, as we witnessed in the past. I expressed my opinion that no international operations can serve the purpose of carrying out illegal practices typical of a police state.

[signed] Jerzy Urban

Poland: Interior Minister: Secret Services To Reform in Oct

WS0306144996 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Krzysztof Kaszynski and Jacek Podgorski: "No Earthquake at UOP; Secret Services Reform in October"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"I do not foresee any earthquake at the Office of State Protection [UOP]," said Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski. He added that a thorough reorganization of the secret services will take place only in October, once the state administration reform is implemented.*

Asked about the latest staffing changes at UOP during a ceremony for handing out diplomas to graduates of a course for noncommissioned officers at the Police Academy in Slupsk, Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski said he "does not foresee any earthquake at UOP." The reorganization of UOP and new staffing decisions can be expected once the reform of the state administration is carried out. The Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] is to be dissolved this October.

UOP will be subordinated to the prime minister, the Political Advisory Committee to the Interior Minister will disappear, and supervising and issuing opinions on candidates for key offices at UOP will rest with the Sejm Secret Services Commission.

Former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski told ZYCIE WARSZAWY that projects to change the status of UOP has resurfaced every time a new interior minister has taken over since 1989. Different variants were considered. There were concepts of removing intelligence alone from the MSW structures and subordinating it to the president.

The final project provides for removing UOP from MSW structures and subordinating it to the prime minister. Milczanowski, meanwhile, claims it is rational to remove the Intelligence Directorate from UOP structures, "whereas, as far as the Counterintelligence Directorate is concerned, the issue is debatable." The former minister is not certain whether the Political Advisory Committee, dealing with a wider range of issues than the Sejm Commission, should be dissolved. Apart from passing opinions on the secret services, it also deals with the Police and the Fire Brigade.

New projects recently developed by UOP provide for the establishment of a fourth directorate at UOP to deal with economic issues, complementing the Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Investigation Directorates. It would deal with the protection of trade in the broadest

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sense and handle huge scandals and crimes affecting the economy.

Siemiatkowski stated in Slupsk that he is unable to say whether the changes at UOP headquarters will bring changes in the field offices. "I consider myself to be a coordinator of the operations of the secret services, and I do not intend to assume the authority of their chiefs," the minister added.

Poland: Decision To Drop Oleksy Case Investigation Upheld

WS0306122696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 1-2 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Jerzy Jachowicz: "The Chief Military Prosecutor's Office on the Dropping of the Oleksy Case Investigation; The Right Decision, Mistakes Unimportant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chief Military Prosecutor's Office [NPW] officially upheld the decision made by Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz to discontinue the investigation into the case of Jozef Oleksy. Colonel Jaroslaw Kieronski of the NPW inspection section, who looked into the investigation, decided that the case was conducted in line with the principles of the profession, Colonel Wlodzimierz Pospiech, press officer of the NPW, reported on 31 May. The decision to start the investigation was correct; the investigation was conducted properly, and the decision to discontinue it was well founded. Col. Kieronski did not have any major reservations to the officially presented reasons for the decision. It is worth recalling that the document that presented those reasons was criticized because it disclosed secrets related to the operational work of the secret services, including information that helped to identify the Russian double agent.

According to the supervising officer, one of the major mistakes Gorzkiewicz made was failing to confront Colonel Waclaw Skoczylas, a witness for the defense, with General Marian Zacharski.

Poland: SLD, Opposition Wrangle Over Identity of Agent 'O'

WS0306144096 Warsaw RZECZ[illegible]OLITA in Polish 3 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Who Is Agent 'O'? SLD: He Is a UOP Functionary; Opposition: This Is an Attempt at Diverting Attention From a Politician Serving the KGB"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Politicians from the Democratic Left Alliance are suggesting that "O" (the double—or turned—agent, a so-called defector) is an officer of the Office for State Protection [UOP] collaborating with the KGB. The opposition claims that these are two separate cases and that the SLD is trying to divert attention from a Russian intelligence agent in the political elite.*

"The UOP report answers the question of who agent 'O' is," said [Interior] Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski. Told that not everyone was convinced about this, he retorted that "they seemingly do not know how to read such documents." Several days ago, RZECZPOSPOLITA reported that members of the Political Advisory Committee [to the interior minister] said it had been purported to them that agent "O" was a UOP counterintelligence officer arrested a couple of months ago by the Warsaw Voivodship Prosecutor's Office for carrying out classified documents.

However, opposition deputies who had been familiarized with the report of the internal UOP commission investigating the legality of operations carried out by officers handling the "Oleksy case" claim that they are not sure this is true.

Former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski told RZECZPOSPOLITA that this was absurd: "First, Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz came forth with his brilliant version, now the SLD is presenting its own. Where is the evidence?"

Bogdan Borusewicz [deputy chairman of the Sejm commission investigating the Oleksy case]: "It is difficult to infer the identity of agent 'O' from the report. One could say that Olin is anybody."

Mieczyslaw Czerniawski (SLD), a member of the Political Advisory Committee, suggested in press statements that one of the reasons the findings of the report are causing the opposition to grow restless is that it indicates who agent "O" is. "I think that the opposition—including Senator Kozlowski, the former Interior Minister—is afraid of the details included in the report," Czerniawski adds.

Senator Krzysztof Kozlowski told RZECZPOSPOLITA that identifying agent "O" as the UOP officer is an attempt at diverting attention from the truth: "From the very beginning, it was said that he was a politician whom the Russian secret services found access to. Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz and [UOP Chief] Colonel Kapkowski even went on to suggest that he was a representative of the opposition. Maybe an officer was turned, as well, but that is a separate case. The basic question that requires answering at the moment is whether there is an agent in the political elites."

"When the minister says on the forum of the Sejm that the identity of agent 'O' is known, he provokes speculations that are then used by the SLD as an element

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of propagandistic stratagems," say politicians from the opposition.

On Saturday [1 June], Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych met with President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Zych disclosed that the talks pertained to, among other things, the operations of the special committee investigating the "Oleksy case."

During a ceremony of handing out diplomas to graduates of a course for noncommissioned officers at the Police Academy in Slupsk, Minister Siemiatkowski stated that he cannot say whether changes at headquarters will bring change to the UOP field offices. He did add, however: "I do not foresee any earthquake in UOP."

Poland: Sejm Passes Amendment Enfranchising PRL Relicts

WS0406115996 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 31 May 96 p 1

[Report by "DOM, MM": "Shadows of the PRL; Enfranchising the Clientele"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Organizations rooted in the Polish People's Republic [PRL] will now be able to recover the buildings they used before 1990 from gminas.*

Yesterday the Sejm overruled the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal questioning an amendment to the Law on Land Economy and Expropriation.

The amendment, endowing organizations operating in PRL days with the right to appropriate real estate without any charge, was suggested by Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] deputies. Initially, the law gave the right to appropriate exclusively cooperatives (for example, housing cooperatives) with land and building facilities. The SLD deputies, however, suggested that the list be broadened to include "other legal persons." The Sejm approved. Many deputies admitted afterwards that they were unaware of the consequences of passing the amendment.

Gminas were the first to wise up, particularly when the first claims were being raised. The Workers Vacation Fund, affiliated with the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement, demanded that 230 holiday homes be returned. The gminas filed a complaint with the Constitutional Tribunal, which passed a ruling in their favor. In January 1996, the Tribunal stated that the amendment violates the principles of social justice and the proprietorship rights of the gminas.

Yesterday the deputies rejected the Tribunal's ruling. There were 11 dissenting votes above the required two-thirds. Few coalition deputies abstained or supported the ruling. The Union of Labor was divided.

The Freedom Union claims that the Polish Peasant Party and the SLD are thus enfranchising their political clientele.

[Immediately beneath the above report is a 100-word untitled report by Michal Matys. "The coalition took the opportunity of the opposition's inattentiveness and the carelessness of the former president, who had signed the unfortunate amendment." Matys says: "The Republic of Comrades is returning again."]

Poland: Rightists Form 'New Poland' Initiative

WS0306125796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "K.Gr.": "Idea for One Ticket; 'New Poland'—Another Attempt at Agreement on the Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Election staff members of former [presidential] candidates Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Marek Markiewicz, Leszek Moczulski, and Lech Walesa want to draw up a joint election ticket. At the "Seven Years After" conference held in Warsaw yesterday, they announced the emergence of the "New Poland" initiative. Former presidential candidates (without Walesa, who is currently visiting the United States) approved the idea of a joint election ticket, although they did not support the initiative expressis verbis. Moczulski [chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland] distanced himself from the project.*

Jerzy Gwizdz, former chief of Lech Walesa's staff, was reserved, claiming that he would take a stand on the issue only after he heard Lech Walesa's opinion. Romuald Szeremietiew, formerly Gwizdz's deputy, supported the idea.

New Poland wants to be "an initiative for a joint ticket in the parliamentary elections." An issued declaration speaks of the necessity "to consolidate groups stemming from the anticommunist opposition and Solidarity." The initiative is open to anyone who wants to "deter the threats the current system poses." In a letter to [Solidarity Chairman] Marian Krzaklewski, the participants declared their willingness to cooperate with Solidarity.

The majority of the organizers of yesterday's meeting were former members of the Center Accord [PC], dispersed among various staffs and groupings: Andrzej Urbanski (chairman of the meeting), Tadeusz Kowalczyk (Markiewicz's staffer), Andrzej Anusz (Gronkiewicz-Waltz's staffer), Wojciech Dobrzynski of the PC Integration Initiative, and Antoni Bielewicz of the Polish Right.

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Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz claims that everyone must "examine his conscience" before attempts at building anything new are launched. She is against "actions" carried out only for the sake of elections, advocating instead a long-term strategy based on shared values. Marek Markiewicz claims that the meeting was important because it offered people rooted in Solidarity an opportunity to talk. Freedom Union's Bronislaw Komorowski, an invited guest, supported the concept of a joint election ticket in his own name. He maintains that there are no insurmountable platform differences between center-right parties.

Leszek Moczulski supported the idea of uniting the center-right, yet he stressed that this was only one of many initiatives. When his party opponent Adam Slomka took the floor, he walked out, saying he was leaving to attend a similar meeting.

Poland: Spokesman Says President Wants Elections Next Spring

LD0306153496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The president's spokesman Antoni Styrczula has confirmed that the president thinks that new parliamentary elections should be held in the spring [1997] to enable the new parliament to prepare and take full responsibility for the new budget.

He also said that the president would soon name the people to be appointed to the National Security Council.

He did not rule out the possibility of holding a meeting between representatives of the Episcopate and the National Assembly Constitutional Commission in the immediate future. The meeting would be held to discuss any controversial entries in the draft of the new constitution.

Poland: Peasant Party, Freedom Union Oppose May Elections

WS0306145196 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "(RN)" under the "In Poland" rubric: "The PSL and UW Against Holding Elections in May"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] will not allow parliamentary elections to be held earlier, as suggested by President Aleksander Kwasniewski. Jozef Oleksy, chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, spoke for May elections yesterday. Jozef Zych, Sejm speaker and chairman of the PSL National Council, said in Zielona Gora that there is no reason for holding the elections in May. "I wish to make it clear that no force exists in this country that would be capable of having parliamentary elections held or parliament dissolved against the will of the PSL," he said. Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Freedom Union [UW] Parliamentary Club, also supported the idea of holding the elections in the fall. One UW activist in Lublin rhetorically asked why the SLD wants elections to be held in the spring: Is it because it is ashamed of the budget or because it fears the pope's visit?

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Romania: Defense Council Says NATO Entry 'Fundamental Goal'

AU0306184896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, President Ion Iliescu chaired the meeting of the Supreme Defense Council of the Country [CSAT] dedicated to examining and approving the measures intended to meet the preconditions for Romania joining NATO. Confirming that the fundamental goal of Romanian foreign policy, as stipulated by the 1992-96 government program, which has been sanctioned by the Romanian Parliament, is to meet all the preconditions for integrating Romania into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and strategic structures fully and quickly, the CSAT reasserted that Romania joining NATO represents the priority strategic objective of the security and defense policy of the country.

The communique released by the presidency spokesman points out that, in general terms, at the level of the NATO officials and institutions, the efforts and actions undertaken by Romania in its cooperation with NATO and the preparations made in view of joining that body are appreciated, and especially Romania's participation in the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program and the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the dialogue within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC].

The CSAT reiterates the idea that Romania presents itself, to an equal extent, as both a security consumer and an important security supplier and that its integration within NATO could represent an important guarantee for peace and stability in Europe.

Romania does not oppose the adherence to NATO of any other central European country and considers that Romania and Hungary joining NATO simultaneously cannot be anything but beneficial. In this process, the possibility should be avoided that the admittance of certain new members should be done by excluding other candidates.

Proceeding from the fact that Romania's option regarding its membership of NATO is clearly and firmly defined and that it enjoys the broad support of the political forces and public opinion, the CSAT debated the documents entitled Romania's NATO Integration Strategy and Basic Elements of Romania's Stance Regarding NATO Integration, both being guidelines describing concrete steps in the political-diplomatic and economic-military fields, civil society's democratic control of the armed forces, and ensuring the interoperability of the Romanian Army and the armies of the NATO member countries.

For the finalization of the aforementioned documents, the CSAT recommended that consultations should be organized among the representatives of political parties and their factions in Parliament. [passage omitted]

This afternoon, Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu arrived in Berlin, where he is to attend the meeting of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher with his counterparts in countries participating in the PFP. Tomorrow, Mr. Melescanu is to attend the NACC session, a body consisting of the foreign affairs ministers of the NATO member countries and the countries that have manifested their wish to join NATO.

The Romanian foreign affairs minister is to present the U.S. secretary of state with the decisions made today by the CSAT in its session dedicated exclusively to Romania's integration into NATO.

Romania: PD Alleges Electoral Fraud; CDR Assesses Results

AU0306174996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1620 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Party [PD] commission specially set up for the 1996 elections made a first evaluation of the first round of the elections and concluded that the elections were characterized by absenteeism, grave organizational deficiencies, and acts of electoral fraud, reports the PD Press Office, citing the ROMPRES news agency.

A communique issued by that office says that, quote, it is already clear that the entire responsibility for this lies with the government and the principal ruling party; that is, the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania]. It is equally clear that the results have been rigged in certain constituencies, as they do not express the electorate's genuine will. The PD and the Social Democratic Union [USD] express their concern over the grave situation in which the country has been pushed once again by the PDSR and its government and reserves the right to resort to all legal means to combat the further rigging of the current elections, unquote, says the communique.

At a news conference held today, Mr. Victor Ciorbea, the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] candidate for the post of Bucharest general mayor, stated that the ruling party is trying to use the poor election turnout to repeat the first round of the ballot. Victor Ciorbea presented several centralized partial results computed by the CDR central electoral bureau on the basis of the duplicates of the official reports received before this morning from the polling stations. Thus, in the capital city, from the results from 30 polling stations representing the options of 16,653 electors regarding the

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district councilors, 47 percent favor the CDR, 20 percent the PDSR, 12 percent the USD, 4 percent the PRM [Greater Romania Party], 3 percent the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], and 3 percent the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], Mr. Ciorbea said.

Regarding the electorate's choice for Bucharest general mayor, according to the aforementioned partial results, the result is as follows: of the 17,530 valid votes, 43 percent favor Victor Ciorbea, 32 percent favor Ilie Nastase [PDSR candidate], 9 percent favor Anton Vatasescu [USD candidate], 4 percent favor Dinu Patriciu [independent], and 4 percent favor Doru Viorel Ursu [independent]. Victor Ciorbea said that the CDR holds the majority throughout Bucharest, but that they were expecting the official results from the Central Electoral Bureau.

Romania: Funar Reportedly Elected Cluj Mayor in 1st Ballot

AU0406091196

[FBIS Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 0400 GMT on 4 June carries a seven-minute report on "unofficial" data on the results of the 2 June local elections, mentioning that "representatives of the National Statistics Commission worked through the night," however "our reporters could not get new information compared to the data supplied so far because, according to the Commission's employees, the information obtained is not significant. The first centralized returns from offices of the electoral constituencies, Bucharest Municipality, and Bucharest sectors are expected to arrive tomorrow, 5 June."

The announcer mentions that official returns will be announced "on Thursday, 6 June, and any information from other sources is unofficial."

Reports on the results that the radio has received from its correspondents mention that "out of the country's 38 large towns, mayors were elected in seven towns in the first round of voting: in Resita an independent candidate; in Cluj, confirmed one hour ago also by our correspondent, PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] candidate Gheorghe Funar; in Iasi Constantin Simirac, representative of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC]; in Baia Mare Cristian Anghel of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]; in Galati Eugen Tubaca of the PDSR [Party of Social Democracy of Romania]; in Targu Mures, Imre Fodor of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]; and in Satu Mare also a UDMR candidate. In eight county seats: Pitesti, Calarasi, Targoviste, Targu Jiu, Slatina, Zalau, Focsani, and Timisoara—the latter confirmed also this morning by our correspondent—the voting will be repeated because less than half of the electorate turned up at voting stations. In 23 other large towns there will be runoffs."

The announcer mentions that "suspense continues regarding Bucharest, and for the time being there is no exact information about validation of elections or a need to repeat them. A partial and unofficial estimate places CDR candidate Victor Ciorbea as winner with a proportion hovering between 39 and 43 percent, followed by Ilie Nastase of the PDSR with 31.5-32 percent, Anton Vatasescu of the Social-Democratic Union with 8.59 percent, independent candidate Doru Viorel Ursu with 3.84-4 percent, Dinu Patriciu of the Liberal Party '93 with 3.31 percent, Mihai Erbasu of the Socialist Party of Labor with 3.41 percent, Alexandru Atanasiu of PAC with 0.84 percent."

Romania: UDMR Notes Good Performance in Local Elections

LD0306215496 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1900 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [UDMR] has by tonight consolidated its good performance in the Romanian local authority elections. The organization has won at least 22 mayoral posts in County Harghita and 25 posts in County Covasna, while in County Salaj [Szilagy] 15 UDMR candidates have been elected as mayors.

[Correspondent Tibor Bogdan] The Democratic Convention [of Romania] scored an easy victory over the UDMR in Baia Mare [Nagybanya]. However, it was in vain as the election will be declared null and void because the turnout was only 48 percent.

Owing to low participation, the first round of the election may have to be repeated in Timisoara [Temesvar] as well.

The major loser in the elections is the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], the senior government coalition party, which was unable to break into Transylvania or keep its position in the Sub-Carpathian regions, where both the Romanian democratic opposition and the extreme left Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] have advanced.

Tonight the candidate of the Democratic Convention was leading with 10 percent in the mayoral election and the opposition bloc was 20 percent ahead of the PDSR in the contest for councillor posts.

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Federal

FRY: Opposition Parties Assess Results of Geneva Summit

AU0306182796

[FBIS Report] Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian at 1222 GMT on 3 June carries a series of reports from Belgrade and Podgorica on the reactions of FRY opposition parties to the Geneva summit.

Milorad Jovanovic, spokesman of the Democratic Party of Serbia, states that the summit in Geneva has only reconfirmed the election deadlines set forth in the Dayton accord.

"Although the prolongation of the elections and uncertainty about them were justified by the lagging implementation of the civilian part of the agreement, everything still revolved around one issue, which is whether Karadzic would stay or go," Jovanovic says.

According to Jovanovic, over the past months various games around Karadzic have been obstructing adoption of the final decision, which is that the elections should be held by 14 September at the latest.

Jovanovic assesses that "the play is not over yet, and the pressures will continue for Karadzic to resign or be extradited to The Hague."

The basic intention of the West is actually to influence the election results, which would ensure a victory of the forces that support the idea of a unitary Bosnia, Jovanovic says, assessing that "this is an obvious example of violation of the agreement because Bosnia is defined by it as a state of two entities."

Jovanovic also adds that "in such a way, one wants, by political means, to give rise to the favoritism of those forces that are pushing the Serb Republic into a unitary Bosnia, while Karadzic, in the Western opinion, personifies all the forces that want only what is set forth in the Dayton accord, which is the Serb Republic's independence."

Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, says that the latest summit in Geneva shows that the "humiliating" role of Serbia in international relations continues and that the great powers continue to exert pressure on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian people.

In his statement for the BETA agency, Seselj says that Milosevic is not able to handle the pressures, and he is making promises he is not able to keep.

"The great powers show that they do not care much about democracy, because they think they can orchestrate the results of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Republic in a way that suits them best," Seselj says, adding that "the will of the Serb people in the Serb Republic is unquestionable, and those who are backed up by the West or Milosevic have no chance of winning the elections."

"Karadzic and Mladic are guarded by the Serb people, and it is impossible to capture them without causing bloodshed," Seselj says.

Vesna Pesic, chairwoman of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, assesses that the Geneva summit has shown that some crucial parts of the Dayton accord are at stake because the signatories are not ready to fulfill their commitments.

Nevertheless, the summit did not produce anything new, and it is apparent that any changes to the Dayton accord are out of question, Pesic tells BETA.

She says that, at the summit, the possibility of postponing the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina was discarded because any postponement would require a modification of the Dayton accord, would prolong the mission of the Implementation Force [IFOR] and would make the enforcement of other changes possible.

"Although the IFOR commander, Leighton Smith, has stated today that the conditions for holding the elections in Bosnia do not exist, it does not suit the United States to change the schedule because the [IFOR] mission ought to end by the time of U.S. presidential elections," Pesic assesses.

Milosevic cannot and will not implement his part of the interstate Dayton agreement, Pesic points out, and reiterates the possibility of the reimposition of sanctions against the FRY if the president of Serbia fails to fulfill his commitments.

Miroljub Labus, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party, assesses that the holding of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the anticipated deadline and under fair conditions is a first step toward reducing tensions and was the most important decision made at the Geneva summit.

In a statement forwarded to various media, Labus points out that "one should not foster illusions that it is possible to implement the civilian part of the Dayton accord without constituting some democratic institutions in the neighboring countries or without resolving the problem that caused the civil war in the first place."

The Democratic Party links the stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina to fair and democratic elections in the entire region, Labus says.

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Radivoje Lazarovic, chairman of the Executive Committee of New Democracy, assesses that the meeting in Geneva is "an act of reinvigorating and encouraging peace and may mean a turning point in the implementation of the Dayton accord."

"The most important achievement of the Geneva meeting is the agreement on holding free elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina because the Dayton accord in its civilian part has been deadlocked," Lazarevic tells BETA.

In Podgorica today Dragisa Burzan, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro, assesses that the meeting in Geneva was an instrument used by Western states to apply further pressure on all three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as on Serbia and Croatia.

"The meeting in Geneva did not produce anything new, except that the United States has forced out concrete promises," Burzan tells BETA.

He says that "the only certain thing is that there will be no bargaining over the amnesty of war criminals, and that all the indicted persons will have to be extradited to the Hague Tribunal."

FRY: Indicted Officers Threaten To Implicate Leadership

AU0306194696 Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 96 pp 28-29

[Article by Kresimir Meler: "Snake Does Not Bite Snake"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The possibility of Colonel Sljivancanin and his colleague Mile Mrksic being extradited to The Hague Tribunal for war crimes committed in Vukovar has increased considerably over the past few days. Faced with this possibility, these two—together with a group of officers who could suffer a similar fate—have threatened that, if they are extradited, they would hand over to The Hague Tribunal documents that implicate the military and, even more so, the political leadership of the FRY and Serbia, including Milosevic himself.

It took days for the Belgrade generals and politicians to recover from this unpleasant surprise. Then a repeated threat of renewed sanctions came from The Hague unless Milosevic handed over Sljivancanin, Mrksic, and the others soon. The General Staff met the same evening. At this meeting Chief of General Staff General Perisic said that "the entire business regarding cooperation with The Hague has become extremely critical, and mainly because of the sloppiness of the work of the military intelligence and counterintelligence services, which have allowed certain recordings and video footage to fall into the wrong hands, so now the entire state leadership can be blackmailed presumably also with rigged shots." Sources close to the Belgrade military leadership also claim that Perisic said that "these documents have to be retrieved, and all the others have to be put in a safe place or perhaps handed over to The Hague Tribunal with possible prior intervention in technical detail."

Divided Leadership

Gen. Dimitrijevic, head of the counterintelligence service, opposed this vehemently, saying that "it is not fair now to lay all the blame on two or three people when it is common knowledge that they were operatives on the ground, while some of us here were sitting and deciding what should be done and how. I oppose any kind of action to extradite our officers or gather evidence against them. If The Hague has anything on them, it can use it to prove their guilt, but the evidence has to be handed over to us. I am speaking on behalf of a group of officers that will not allow the extradition of active or retired low-ranking or high-ranking officers of the Yugoslav People's Army or the Yugoslav Army."

Milan Gvero, who also attended the meeting, then said that the extradition of any soldier could seriously endanger the stability of the army and even the stability of the state since the propaganda so far has convinced the public that these people were heroes. According to him, it would be impossible now to persuade anyone that they were all criminals.

The military leadership was completely split. Still the generals managed to agree to send a delegation to Milosevic to present the views of the army. They also agreed to hold talks with the men sought by The Hague who have been threatening the military and political leadership with documents, recordings, and video footage. This was done. Veselin Sljivancanin was the first one invited. Our source, who attended the talks himself, says that this criminal from Vukovar was first played a recording of a conversation between himself and Seselj, in which Sljivancanin tells Seselj that "the trucks for transport have been reserved, and all those who are facing court martial should be transported to Ovcara, to the Bugarsko cemetery, and the job should be done there." Sljivancanin could also hear himself talking to Zivota Panic, asking him for "correction of fire. It should be directed at Mitnica and the Nemacko cemetery, that is where their positions are." He was shown video footage where he is explaining to ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] representatives that he will "raze Vukovar to the ground because the Ustashas killed his driver."

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Counterproof

According to the same source, there is evidence against Sljivancanin in the form of a recording on which Sljivancanin can be heard demanding from someone in Pancevo "reinforcements with as many volunteers as possible. The town needs to be cleaned up, and not all our soldiers are up to it." Sljivancanin was also filmed near Ovcara (which can be seen in the background) hugging Seselj and Arkan. Our source claims that bulldozers can be seen on the film burying something. There is also a recording of Sljivancanin's conversation with Mrksic in which they are discussing the number of courts martial in the absence of the accused "who were prevented from coming" and places set for executions and in which Ovcara and the Bugarsko cemetery are again mentioned by name. Furthermore, there is a recording that was played both to Sljivancanin and Mrksic in which Seselj says clearly to Adzic that "Mile and Sljivo Sljivancanin's nickname) took the transport to Ovcara and had everything under control there."

As for Mrksic, on top of all this, he was also shown video footage in which he can be seen, together with Radic, overseeing the wounded and prisoners of war getting on buses that left for Ovcara later on. And that is not all. Both Sljivancanin and Mrksic were played a recording in which they can be heard talking about "the need to reduce the number of prisoners to the maximum. This should be like any other reprisal operation. Many of them are too dangerous to be transported."

There is also a recording of a conversation between Kadijevic and Sljivancanin in which, asked whether "so many people had to be liquidated," the latter says that "they are all criminals, their crimes have been proven, and the court martial has already taken care of that. There is nothing there to talk about. It is a done thing."

Last Tuesday Ratko Mladic visited Belgrade on the pretext of attending Djordje Djukic's funeral. He was also shown documents in which he can be heard ordering which parts of Sarajevo his troops should shell. There is a recording of a conversation between him and Karadzic in which Mladic is saying that "the plan has been carried out, and a lot of balijas [derogatory Serb name for Bosnian Muslims] are in a safe place where they will not bother anyone again." Following the presentation of these documents, they were all told "to cool it, since their extradition will not be allowed. But if they continue with their threats, there could be further unpleasantries."

Direct action prompted direct reaction. A lot of people in Belgrade are smiling. Is there going to be another reaction?

Serbia

Serbia: Official Demands Croatia Guarantee Safety to Serbs

LD0306164496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1629 GMT 3 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 3 (TANJUG)—Serbian commissioner for refugees Bratislava Morina said here on Monday that the international community must force Croatia to respect human rights and guarantee safety and security to Serbs in its territory.

A failure of the United Nations mission in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem would be a defeat for Europe and the entire international community, Morina said in talks with coordinator of the Geneva-based Special Department of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the Former Yugoslavia (SOFY) Rene van Rooyen.

Croatian troops last year captured all parts of the republic of Serb Krajina (state proclaimed by Serbs in Croatia) except its eastern region situated between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Van Rooyen said the question of Serbs' return to Krajina was highly important at this moment and that international forces in eastern Slavonia would do everything to restore trust between the Croat and Serb populations in the region.

Morina and van Rooyen agreed that conditions have to be created for the return of refugees from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to their earlier places of residence.

Van Rooyen agreed with Morina's proposal to organize a regional meeting of all commissioners for refugees from the former Yugoslav republics in the near future, so that the problem of refugees could be tackled in direct contacts.

Serbia: Opposition Party Says Karadzic Should Stay in Power

LD0306182196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1715 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Jun (SRNA)—Aleksandar Vucic, secretary general of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), said today that it is madness to demand that someone who has the support of the people, as is evident in the case of Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic, should be removed from power.

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"If Serbs want Radovan Karadzic, nobody—neither President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic nor the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher or anyone else—can ban it," Vucic told SRNA.

Commenting on the Geneva conference that ended today [as received], the SRS secretary general said that it had not brought anything new "except that this time Milosevic was answering Warren Christopher without pressure."

"It is good the announced elections will be held in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, although these agreements contain several points unacceptable to us," Vucic added.

He explained that "parties that are to the liking of the international community were favored and promised financial incentives and media support."

Serbia: Daily Views 'Game' of Karadzic 'Withdrawal'

AU0306151496 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 96 pp 16-17

[Commentary by Dragan Janjic: "Biljana Waded Across the Drina River"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Biljana Plavsic, a vice president of the Serb Republic, visited Belgrade on Tuesday [21 May]. She met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic's cabinet issued official information on that meeting, calling Mrs. Plavsic the acting president of the Serb Republic. Belgrade issued public information on a meeting with the Karadzic's closest assistants for the first time since the sanctions were imposed against the Serb Republic. The meeting with Milosevic was also attended by Nikola Koljevic, a vice president of the Serb Republic.

Biljana Plavsic came to Belgrade as Karadzic's deputy for contacts with the international community. Her appointment to that position resulted from the sudden and skillful maneuver that the Bosnian Serb leadership made last weekend. Karadzic took the opportunity, and killed two birds with one stone, by replacing Mr. Rajko Kasagic, the liberal prime minister, and by appointing Mrs. Biljana Plavsic to the key negotiating position, a position very close to him, since he is certain that she will carry out the policy adopted by the Pale leadership consistently.

NATO Defends Kasagic

Everything started on 15 May when Karadzic's cabinet in Pale announced the decision to dismiss Prime Minister Kasagic. As was expected, the opposition parties in Banja Luka and the deputies to the Bosnian Serb Assembly from that region responded very sharply and started preparations to defend the prime minister. The decision was made public on the same day that the Yugoslav Assembly dismissed Dragoslav Avramovic, the National Bank president, and the media and politicians simply did not know which issue should be given priority.

Kasagic held a news conference the following day, at which he said that Karadzic was "an illegal president" and that he would retain his position until the decision on his dismissal was taken by the Assembly. There were sharp international reactions, and Javier Solana, the NATO secretary general, came to Banja Luka and openly supported Kasagic. This visit had been planned earlier, but it took place at a moment when it could be interpreted as the expression of the powerful will and decisiveness of the West to support the dismissed prime minister to the very end. Carl Bildt, the top representative of the international community, accompanied Mr. Solana on his visit to Banja Luka. He supported Kasagic too.

Making use of the confusion caused by the sudden decision on Kasagic's dismissal, Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik, the chairman of the Assembly, suddenly convened a—practically secret—session of the parliamentary club of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], which has an absolute majority in the Assembly, in Pale on the afternoon of 17 May. It was only natural that the Club supported Karadzic.

Momo [Krajisnik] in Belgrade

Sources close to the Bosnian Serb leadership claim that Krajisnik visited Belgrade on the eve of the SDS parliamentary club session and he met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. According to the same sources, he informed Milosevic of the attitudes of the current Serb Republic leadership on the situation, and he probably offered Karadzic's withdrawal on condition that Belgrade remained silent about the dismissal of the liberal Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic.

Early in the morning of 18 May, the session of the SDS parliamentary club in Pale was practically transformed into a session of the Assembly, at which the decision about Kasagic's dismissal was confirmed. The usual practice to publicly announce a session of the Assembly was not respected this time, but no one complained that the official procedure was violated. The Assembly elected Gojko Klickovic as the new prime minister. Everything went smoothly, and there were no turbulent reactions from official Belgrade or from the deputies from the region of Banja Luka who had supported the former prime minister.

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On the same day, that is on 18 May, Radovan Karadzic's cabinet issued a statement that Biljana Plavsic, a vice president, would "take over some functions" of the Serb Republic president because Mr. Karadzic had to "work on other tasks." Several hours later, without any apparent dilemma whatsoever, Belgrade media issued a statement that Karadzic was withdrawing from his position and started intensively broadcasting information and statements from both the country and abroad that supported this unfolding of events.

This is a partial explanation of the Bosnian Serb Assembly's sudden readiness to dismiss Kasagic. It must not be forgotten that Karadzic had tried to dismiss Kasagic in the Assembly less than a month ago, but failed since Kasagic was supported by the Banja Luka deputies. This was, naturally, performed with the full support of Belgrade. The people who know the circumstances in Banja Luka expected that the situation of a month ago would be repeated in the Assembly, so that the difference is explained by the lack of will in Belgrade to support Kasagic.

Until the Assembly session took place, the state-controlled Belgrade media had written about Kasagic's dismissal and quoted all information and all statements that were to his advantage and against Karadzic. But by the first day after the dismissal had been carried out, that is on Sunday [19 May], Kasagic was forgotten, and the headlines about Karadzic's withdrawal from his position appeared on the front pages of Belgrade newspapers. In the afternoon of the same day, there came the first denials from both Pale and Banja Luka of Karadzic's withdrawal. This was also done officially by Biljana Plavsic on Monday. She said at a news conference in Banja Luka that the whole thing was "fabricated" and that Karadzic's withdrawal was out of question. Well-informed sources close to the Bosnian Serb leadership claim that it is certain that Milosevic—choosing between Krajisnik's offer that Karadzic would withdraw and the possibility to maintain the pressure on the Bosnian Serb Assembly deputies and remain firm in support of Kasagic—decided to choose Karadzic's withdrawal.

Playing

With the tacit support of Belgrade, Krajisnik and Karadzic did not find it difficult to convince the deputies to vote against Kasagic, who had already been characterized in the public as the man who wanted to "reintegrate" the Serb Republic into Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus "giving it to the Muslims."

It is, however, not quite clear whether Karadzic and Krajisnik—in their meticulous game—deceived Milosevic and circumvented the promised resignation or whether Milosevic was aware what would happen, but did not want to do anything, since the "hard-liners" are still closer to him than Kasagic, who maintained close contacts with the international community. Simply speaking, it is still not quite clear whether Pale deceived Milosevic or whether Milosevic and Karadzic "played" the international community together.

In any case, Carl Bildt, the high representative, and the international community received a typically Balkan slap. They were first "lured" into open support of a politician (Rajko Kasagic) and then left in the lurch. The present situation simply forces Carl Bildt to negotiate with Biljana Plavsic, and on occasions when she and Karadzic find it convenient. On Tuesday, after the talks with President Milosevic, Bildt claimed that everything is not over yet and that the pressure on Karadzic will continue. The top representative is obviously still being convinced by Milosevic that Karadzic will leave. He also said that the Serb Republic president should state his withdrawal in writing.

A statement might come, but it will not contain the information that the Serb Republic president has resigned but that he has ceded some of his powers to Biljana Plavsic. This doesn't change anything since Karadzic still has everything under his control. Bildt can only "pretend" that the Serb Republic president who does not take key political decisions has left. Everybody, however, knows that Karadzic and Plavsic have shared opinions since the very beginning and that Biljana Plavsic is probably the last person who would "betray" Karadzic.

Hawks

If the pressure the West had exerted on Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs was aimed at achieving a formal personnel change in the leadership of the Serb Republic, then it has practically been achieved. If—which is more likely—the basic intention was to bring politicians to power who will be more inclined to Sarajevo and the unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, the whole thing has failed for a relatively long period of time. People who know the circumstances in Banja Luka say that the latest events have weakened the influence of the moderate political wings that started gathering in that city. Biljana Plavsic spent almost all the war years in Banja Luka, and the new prime minister also comes from that region. Since Plavsic is the official negotiator now, all international activities will move to Banja Luka, but they will be performed by her, not by the representatives of moderate wings.

It is also certain that the efforts that have been made for months by the international community—especially IFOR [Implementation Force] and Bildt—and Belgrade

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to strengthen the moderate wings in Banja Luka, who would have helped remove Karadzic, and to impose them as the key element in the negotiations with the world and with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been put at stake. The election is very close, and the prospects that the radical wing of the Bosnian Serb leadership will become weaker have been reduced.

The appointment of the new prime minister, demonstrating the power of Karadzic and his closest assistants, has achieved full legitimacy. If it suits their interests, Karadzic and Krajisnik can postpone the next session of the assembly for months and, in the meantime, use the new prime minister in any way they choose.

Yet another goal that is of fundamental importance for the Bosnian Serbs has been achieved—the ties with Slobodan Milosevic have been resumed officially. It is certain that Plavsic, in her role as "acting president" of the Serb Republic (or Karadzic's deputy for contacts with the world, as this is interpreted in Pale), will come to Belgrade again. Just as Bildt can "pretend" that there have been big changes, Milosevic can also interpret the events as Karadzic's withdrawal and justify his decision to resume contacts with Pale.

By resuming the contacts, Milosevic can influence the behavior of the Pale leadership from "inside." Apart from that, Serbia is interested in preserving the unity of the Serb Republic, and it is easier for it to do so through the established leadership than to struggle with the creation of a new one.

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